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Public clouds offer valuable services at the expense of privacy. Since the
cloud provider controls the privileged software on their machines (the operating
system and the hypervisor), they enjoy access to the secrets processed by the
applications they host. As a result, users must either trust public clouds or
avoid them. Recently, hardware manufacturers have extended CPU designs to
provide trusted execution environments (TEEs). Hardware ensures the data
inside a TEE can only be accessed by the code inside that TEE, protecting
secrets from all software that the provider controls.
However, TEEs do not provide meaningful security for many applica-
tions on their own. In practice, many applications are proprietary or make
use of accelerators like GPUs. Code inside the TEE has access to user secrets
and the freedom to communicate them to the outside world; users cannot
vet proprietary code to ensure it does not exercise that freedom (accidentally
or intentionally). GPUs are not controlled by the CPU directly but instead
by drivers under the cloud provider’s control, making it trivial for the cloud
vii
provider to extract secrets that the user offloads to a GPU for processing. GPU
TEEs can prevent unauthorized access to GPU memory, but communication
with the GPU can still leak information.
We demonstrate system designs that leverage existing (CPU) and pro-
posed (GPU) TEEs that protect users‘ data even when the application code
is colluding with the cloud provider to steal it, or when the user offloads parts
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Public clouds are collections of computing services offered over the In-
ternet to those willing to pay for their use. Some notable examples of public
cloud providers are Amazon Web Services [Amab], Microsoft Azure [azu14],
and Google Cloud [Goo]. Public clouds fill two roles: first, they host public-
facing services like image editing (Pixlr [Pix]), tax preparation (TurboTax [Int]),
or even personal health analyses (23andMe [23ab]). Second, public clouds pro-
vide large pools of resources. Users with computationally intensive workloads—
e.g., training deep neural networks (DNNs)—can rapidly gain access to a large
pool of machines with large amounts of memory, many CPU cores, and ac-
celerators like GPUs. Public clouds have asserted themselves as platforms of
consequence; Amazon Web Services alone reported 35 billion dollars in revenue
for 2019 (about a third of the public cloud market) [Sta].
The de facto success of public clouds is obvious from their market size,
but public clouds remain a non-option for users with sensitive data. Cloud
providers necessarily control the privileged software (i.e., the hypervisor and
the operating system) on their machines for legitimate reasons: controlling
privileged software allows providers to multiplex many users across physical
machines, ultimately reducing costs and improving user choice. However, a
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side effect of that control is that the cloud provider has full access to the state
of applications. An application can do very little to hide secret data from the
cloud provider. Privileged software controls scheduling, so applications can
be interrupted arbitrarily, giving the cloud provider unfettered access to any
secrets entrusted to them, no matter how briefly the secrets are in memory.
Cloud users must trust providers to provide integrity and privacy or
they must avoid using public clouds altogether. Security-conscious users must
reason about the implications of sharing secret data with public cloud providers
in addition to the operators of the services themselves. For instance, a user of
23andMe might hesitate to disclose data about their health to a company that
might use it for targeted advertisements like Google; a user like Netflix may
want to protect the secrets behind their movie recommendation system from
Amazon, who runs a competing video service.
This dissertation demonstrates systems that provide secrecy guaran-
tees to public cloud users without trusting the platform provider. These sys-
tems leverage a hardware isolation mechanism that stops the cloud provider
from accessing secrets while preserving much of the application’s performance:
Trusted Execution Environments. (TEEs). Hardware (i.e., the processor) en-
sures that only TEE code can access TEE data; hardware protects secrets from
all software that the provider controls, including privileged software.
TEEs have found their way into commodity CPUs. Examples of TEEs
include Intel SGX [Int14], RISC-V Keystone [LKC+18, LKS+20], and the se-
cure world of ARM TrustZone [Lim]. TEEs have also been proposed for
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GPUs [VVB18,JTK+19], though none are available on the market.
While essential to the work described here, TEEs alone are not suffi-
cient to provide meaningful security. One glaring drawback is that prevalent
side channels undermine TEE isolation. Intel SGX has accumulated a ro-
bust catalog of exploits [XCP15,VBMW+18,GESM17,BCD+18]. While these
vulnerabilities certainly call into question the security of TEEs as they exist
today, these exploits do not point to fundamental problems with TEEs; in fact,
Keystone [LKS+20] designs have already removed many side-channel exploits,
e.g., by way-partitioning the last-level cache. Rather than address bugs and
oversights that hardware can and should be solve, the work described here
focuses on core shortcomings of TEE designs and shows how system software
can mitigate them.
We have identified two significant areas where TEEs do not provide
meaningful security as designed. First, data-processing services are often
closed source. Service providers have incentives to keep their code secret,
forcing the user to trust them with secrets to use the service. Second, offload-
ing computation to GPUs leaves applications open to easily exploitable timing
attacks.
1.1 Protecting secrets from the services that process
them
Operators of user-facing services often keep their code proprietary to
protect their competitive advantage: obscuring their service’s details creates a
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barrier protecting ideas they spent time and money developing. An unfortu-
nate side effect is that users of the service have little visibility into what the
code is doing. Any code inside a TEE can access all TEE data— including
user secrets—and has the freedom to communicate anything it can access to
the outside world. Proprietary code, by definition, cannot be vetted to ensure
it does not exercise that freedom (accidentally or intentionally). Furthermore,
sometimes the cloud provider is the service provider, so collusion between
application code in the TEE and the platform is also a concern.
Ryoan [HZX+16, HZX+18] is a system designed to address this prob-
lem. Ryoan is a distributed sandbox that allows users to keep their data
secret without trusting the software stack, developers, or administrators of
these services. The core idea is to confine the code that users cannot vet (i.e.,
untrusted code). Service code can remain proprietary, but the Ryoan sand-
box carefully controls its communication with the outside world, confining
the service. Confining untrusted code is a longstanding problem that remains
technically challenging [Lam73]. Ryoan meets the challenges of confinement
by taking advantage of TEEs and by assuming a request-oriented data model.
Confined services only process input once and cannot read or write persistent
state (storage) after receiving the input. This model limits Ryoan’s applica-
bility to request-oriented server applications—but such servers are the most
common way to bring scalable services to large numbers of users.
A näıve (but secure) approach to a confinement system like Ryoan re-
stricts services to a single TEE. This näıve design has performance limitations
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because TEEs cannot span multiple processors, and it raises privilege sepa-
ration concerns since some services involve code and interests from mutually
distrustful parties. Rather than resigning applications to those restrictions,
Ryoan allows providers to distribute their services across many processors.
Ryoan also provides a coarse-grained information flow control mechanism to
protect service provider secrets and user secrets when they flow through TEEs
containing code that the service providers themselves do not trust. With these
mechanisms, Ryoan achieves reasonable flexibility for service providers without
sacrificing security.
1.2 Securely offloading computation to cloud GPUs
Performance improvements enabled by GPUs have driven the success of
machine learning and computer vision in application domains such as medicine
[Hem17, SFB+15], finance [GGKSC13], insurance [NVI16], and communica-
tion [NVI17a]. Cloud providers have taken notice; today, GPUs are available
on every major public cloud. However, GPU computation is still insecure in
public clouds: without hardware intervention, the provider is free to examine
GPU state at will and extract secret data.
GPU TEEs (when realized) will protect secrets from cloud providers
while they are on GPUs, but offloading computation to a GPU involves com-
munication over the PCI bus1. While GPU TEEs protect the content of com-
1We focus on discrete, PCI-attached GPUs because that is the form factor of the best
performing GPUs at time of writing.
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munication (e.g., by encryption for Graviton TEEs [VVB18]), they do not
protect the pattern of communication. Privileged software allows platform
providers to observe the pattern of PCI communication. To show the infor-
mation leaked in GPU communication patterns, we demonstrate an attack on
deep neural network image recognition. We trained a classifier on the GPU
communication patterns of an image recognition application for two image
classes from ImageNet [DDS+09]. Our model was able to distinguish the im-
ages of the two classes with 78% accuracy even though it only had access to
timing information (never the images themselves).
We designed Telekine so that users can securely offload computation
to cloud GPUs. Telekine ensures that communication between the user’s
CPU code and the offloaded GPU computation does not leak by transforming
GPU API calls into data oblivious streams. Telekine constructs data-oblivious
streams by reducing all API calls to a sequence of code execution (launchK-
ernel) and data movement (memcpy) commands. It then schedules these op-
erations at a fixed rate, possibly creating new operations, or splitting memcpy
operations into fixed-size pieces. Fixed-sized, fixed-rate communication en-
sures that any observable patterns are independent of the input data and,
therefore, devoid of side-channel information. Fixed-rate communication is
not a novel way to eliminate side channels, but Telekine’s design shows how
to apply it efficiently to modern GPU-based computing.
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1.3 Writing conventions and organization
Research contributions are almost always the result of the collabora-
tive effort of many minds. In the spirit of that, I will maintain the convention
of using second-person pronouns (our/we) throughout the document. I sum-
marize my specific contributions in footnotes at the beginning of the relevant
chapters.
The rest of this document follows this organization. First, we provide
a detailed description of the public cloud threat model in Chapter 2, followed
by background material on TEEs and GPUs in Chapter 3. Then we describe
the designs of Ryoan and Telekine in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.
Finally, we put the work in context by discussing related work in Chapter 6
and our conclusions in Chapter 7
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Chapter 2
The Malicious Public Cloud Threat Model
To completely remove providers of public clouds (platform providers)
from all levels of trust, we make the conservative assumption that the platform
provider is malicious. The platform provider is a powerful adversary who
controls all software executing on the machines that they control. This control
extends into privileged software, i.e., the operating system and the hypervisor.
By construction, systems that protect data in this model will also protect
against weaker adversaries. For instance, the power of attackers who have
compromised some part of the platform must be a subset of the cloud provider’s
power, and it is in the platform provider’s power to create fake tenants and
mount side-channel attacks.
On the other hand, users must trust hardware and the software of the
systems described in this document. These are reasonable requirements since
the cloud provider has no control over either of these things. CPUs and GPUs
are difficult to modify because their physical packaging is resistant to tam-
pering. Physical modification of these computing devices, especially at scale,
would be expensive for a platform provider so it is reasonable to expect them
to be deployed without modification. Users must assume that hardware man-
ufacturers are not colluding with platform providers, unless the hardware can
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be verified or made open-source for vetting, which is not true of commodity
processors. However, hardware providers have little incentive to design inse-
cure hardware: their business model relies on selling processors rather than
data. A reputation for an insecure product could hinder processor sales in an
increasingly crowded market. The systems described in this dissertation are
open-source, allowing users (or communities of users) to vet and validate their
implementation, making the assumption of trust weaker.
A caveat to trusting hardware is that there are many examples of failed
isolation [HJM+19,HJM+20] (often due to side channels), making much of the
current hardware space unfit for purpose. We take the emergence of commer-
cial TEEs as a sign that manufacturers are willing to take security seriously
and fix isolation. In the limit, software can be augmented with orthogonal
techniques to achieve isolation. There is additional detail about current hard-
ware limitations and known side channels in section 3.2.2.
Denial of service attacks. Denial of service is outside of the scope of our
threat model. The platform provider can always leverage their control to refuse
to scheduler our system or arbitrarily block communication between the client




Providing security guarantees for computation on an untrusted plat-
form is an active area of research. In almost all cases, users must trust hard-
ware. The exceptions are cryptographic techniques which do not require trust
in hardware but greatly magnify the computational and storage costs of the
computation [Gen09]. The choice to use a public cloud is an economic one;
users can always purchase hardware that they control to run their software
securely. Our position is that trusting only hardware is a reasonable compro-
mise, preserving the cloud’s economic advantages while providing the building
blocks for meaningful security.
The work described here uses trusted CPUs and GPUs, both of which
we expect to provide trusted execution environments. Commodity CPUs pro-
vide trusted execution environments (TEEs) today. Robust research proposals
for GPU TEEs exist, but none have yet made their way into the market.
3.1 Attesting hardware authenticity to a remote user
Hardware hosting computation in a malicious public cloud must be able
to prove its authenticity to users. Without proof, the cloud provider can lie
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about the presence of secure hardware and steal a user’s secret data.
The process of proving that a piece of hardware is genuine is called
attestation. Specific attestation mechanisms vary, but they all adopt the same
general form:
1. The manufacturer embeds a secret in the hardware. The embedding pro-
cess comes with some reasonable guarantee that malicious actors cannot
recover the secret by inspecting the hardware. For instance, a CPU se-
cret might be constructed with physically unclonable properties of the
manufactured hardware and never directly exposed to software.
2. Upon request, hardware uses that secret to sign a message cryptograph-
ically. This message usually contains some form of nonce from the user
so that an attacker cannot reuse messages, and possibly some additional
information about hardware state, e.g., SGX signs a description of the
program loaded into the TEE.
3. The remote user receives the message and signature, then goes through a
validation process. Validation depends on the type of signature; it could
be validated against a known public key or forwarded to a trusted service
for validation.
3.2 Trusted Execution Environments
Historically, software system designers have leveraged hardware isola-
tion mechanisms as the basis for secure systems. The user/kernel processor
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mode bit and page tables on CPUs and GPUs are examples of hardware-
enforced isolation mechanisms. These primitives have found favor for decades
because they are efficiently implemented in hardware, and have clear semantics
that system software can use as the basis for security.
Hardware-supported TEEs are yet another isolation mechanism that is
useful for protecting secrets in the malicious public cloud threat model. TEEs
are uniquely useful because they separate isolation from resource management
(e.g., scheduling on processor cores, and memory management). Other iso-
lation mechanisms allow code to keep secrets; e.g., the user/kernel processor
mode bit prevents some code (user-level code) from reading the secrets of
others (kernel-level code). However, user-level code cannot keep secrets from
kernel-level code. Without an additional mechanism, users cannot keep secrets
from the platform provider since they control kernel-level code. TEEs allow
the platform provider to remain in control of resources while preventing them
from accessing user secrets.
TEE designs have been realized by different hardware vendors for CPUs.
Intel has shipped Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) [Int14], which is described
in more detail below. ARM’s offering is called TrustZone [Lim]. TrustZone
provides a “secure world” with provisions for direct control over hardware,
but different chip designs vary on how much hardware is under secure world
control. Direct control over hardware (e.g., control over the PCI bus) makes
secure communication easier because it removes other software’s power to ob-
serve the communication. However, x86 CPUs are still the predominant plat-
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form in public clouds, and it is unclear how compatible secure world control of
hardware would be with the other interests of cloud providers. Finally Key-
stone [LKC+18,LKS+20] is a TEE design for the open-source RISC-V architec-
ture. Keystone has a modular design well suited to selecting the appropriate
level of security for a given threat model.
TEE designs have been proposed by researchers for GPUs. Gravi-
ton [VVB18] proposes changes to GPU firmware allowing a remote user or
a CPU enclave to establish a secure channel for control and data with the
GPU. HIX [JTK+19] extends CPU enclaves with trusted MMIO protections
to protect communication with the GPU rather than relying on cryptography.
The work in this dissertation builds specifically on Intel Software Guard
Extensions [Int14] on CPUs and the proposed Graviton [VVB18] TEEs for
GPUs. The remainder of this chapter provides background on those specific
TEEs.
3.2.1 Intel Software Guard Extensions
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [Int14] provide TEEs on recent Intel
processors. SGX calls each TEE an enclave. An enclave is a region in virtual
memory that is protected by hardware. The contents of an enclave are only
visible to code that is mapped into the enclave’s virtual memory region; this
code is said to be enclave code. Enclave code can read its enclave and all
non-enclave (mapped) memory. Multiple enclaves may exist in a single virtual
address space, but they may not read memory from each other’s regions. En-
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clave code still runs in unprivileged mode (ring 3), and the CPU faults on any
instruction that would raise its privilege level.
Memory protection. Processors that support SGX maintain a special phys-
ical memory pool called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). Physical memory can
only be mapped into an enclave if it comes from the EPC; complementarily,
hardware only allows one enclave to use an EPC page at a time. Data and
code can be paged in and out of the EPC by the operating system through
purpose-built SGX instructions, but pages are encrypted and MACed by the
processor on page-out and then verified and decrypted on page-in.
Memory in the EPC is encrypted by the processor, preventing attackers
from stealing plaintext data using bus sniffing attacks. SGX leverages the
processor’s cache structure to ameliorate the performance overheads involved
in encryption: data is is always unencrypted when it is on the chip and is only
encrypted and decrypted when it moves to and from main memory.
SGX remote attestation. Attesting an SGX processor to a remote user
follows the procedure outlined in Section 3.1 closely. The CPU signs a state-
ment about a particular enclave that the platform provider must forward to
the user. The user can validate the statement by querying a trusted attestation
service. If validation succeeds, the user can be sure they are communicating
with a valid SGX processor.
In addition to proving that the CPU is a real SGX CPU, attestations
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serve to bind identity to an enclave. For our purposes, it is enough to think of
an enclave identity as a hash of the enclave’s initial state, i.e., valid memory
contents, permissions, and relative position in the enclave. Our trust of the
hardware extends to these identities; particularly, we assume that the cloud
provider cannot misrepresent the initial state of an enclave under standard
cryptographic assumptions. SGX also supports binding enclaves to a specific
public.
Knowing the initial state of an enclave allows users to reason about
security. An enclave’s state can only be mutated by enclave code after initial-
ization. Code that can mutate enclave state must itself be part of the attested
initial state.
Hardware threads. CPUs typically have several hardware threads. Hard-
ware threads are execution contexts that may execute code concurrently. With
respect to SGX, each hardware thread is either in enclave mode or it is not.
A thread issues an enclave entry instruction to enter enclave mode. In enclave
mode, every instruction must reside on an EPC page that belongs to the en-
clave that the thread entered. This restriction keeps the operating system from
mapping malicious code pages, which would cause the thread to misbehave.
Threads are only allowed to enter enclaves at specifically defined entry
points. These points are written into enclave memory (and so are part of the
state verified during remote attestation).
If any hardware thread receives an interrupt while in enclave mode, the
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processor stores its registers in enclave memory and clears them before the
thread is taken out of enclave mode to handle the interrupt. The context can
be restored later by another SGX instruction.
3.2.2 Hardware limitations
There are some known security limitations in commodity hardware.
We believe the hardware manufacturers should address these limitations (and
any additional limitations discovered in the future). Each of these limitations
erodes the security afforded by the systems we design to use them. Part of
the purpose of building prototype systems is to determine how its security
guarantees depend on the security guarantees of the hardware they rely on,
thereby motivating fixes for hardware-based limitations.
Transient instruction-based attacks. Transient instructions are proces-
sor instructions that are speculatively executed and update the processor’s
micro-architectural state but are aborted for some reason and do not update
the architectural state. Meltdown [LSG+18] and Spectre [KGG+18] are attacks
that exploit out of order execution and speculative execution, respectively, to
execute transient instructions. These transient instructions influence the pro-
cessor’s micro-architectural state, creating covert channels; both attacks use
the processor cache as a proof of concept. Meltdown is specific to Intel proces-
sors and allows user-level programs to read arbitrary kernel memory. Spectre
applies to a broader range of processors (including Intel, AMD, and ARM), but
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is more difficult to exploit. It allows the attacker to read memory belonging
to a victim running in a separate address space.
There have been successful Spectre attacks that violate SGX isolation,
allowing non-enclave code to read enclave memory [CCX+18,OMA+18].
SGX page faults. On current Intel processors, privileged software can ma-
nipulate the page tables of an enclave to observe a page-granularity trace of
its code and data. Xu et al. demonstrated attacks that use application-level
information to recreate fine-grained secrets from these coarse addresses, e.g.,
words in a document and object outlines in an image [XCP15].
There is active research on detecting or preventing these attacks using
other processor features, e.g., transactional memory [SLKP17, CZRZ17], or
monitoring SGX data structures [OTK+18]. If SGX enclaves serviced their
own page faults, this leakage channel would disappear.
Address bus monitoring. Although SGX encrypts data in RAM, if an
attacker monitors the address bus via a sniffer or a modified RAM chip, it
forms a cache line-granularity side or covert channel. No software system can
prevent such attacks without new architectural changes.
Processor monitoring. Processor monitoring units (PMUs) provide ex-
tensive performance counter information for on-chip events. If the processor
updates the PMU about events that occur in enclave-protected execution, the
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operating system could use the information as a covert channel to learn secrets
via untrusted code, which could modulate its behavior, e.g., to inflate certain
event counts.
According to measurements on Skylake processors, the processor dis-
ables certain monitoring facilities during enclave execution (e.g., Precise Event-
Based Sampling (PEBS)), however the uncore counters (e.g., last level cache
misses) are enabled [CD16]. Effective attacks based on branch history have
been demonstrated [LSG+17]. It is unknown at this time how effective other
attacks based on processor monitoring will be.
Cache timing. Two processes resident on the same core can use cache tim-
ing to obtain fine-grained information about each other. For instance, Zhang
et al. (on an Amazon-EC2-like platform) extracted ElGamal keys from a non-
colluding VM [ZJRR12]. The problem is worse when processes can collude;
others have demonstrated high-bandwidth covert channels using cache behav-
ior [XBJ+11, WX15]. There are hardware proposals to address cache timing
attacks [LWL15].
3.3 GPUs
Current GPU software stacks prioritize high performance and program-
mer convenience over security. While a given instance might, at times, have
exclusive access to a physical GPU, the provider can migrate instances, ex-
posing GPU state. Modern conveniences like elastic GPUs [Amaa, aws] make
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GPUs available over a network connection.
3.3.1 PCIe and device communication
At the hardware level, GPUs can be connected to the system directly
on the CPU memory interconnect (integrated) or by the PCIe bus (discrete).
PCIe-attached GPUs are overwhelmingly preferred in performance-focused set-
tings because this organization enables the GPU to implement a separate
memory subsystem using techniques that enable dramatically higher memory
bandwidth. Memory bandwidth is the first-order determinant for performance
for most GPU workloads. For example, current NVIDIA cards tout a peak
memory bandwidth over 600 GB/s [rtx18], several times higher than the best
current peak CPU memory bandwidth. Therefore, we focus our attention on
PCIe-attached GPUs, as this is the dominant platform for performance.
The PCIe interfaces provide two forms of communication: memory-
mapped I/O (MMIO) and direct memory access (DMA). MMIO is used to
re-purpose regions of the physical memory address space for device communi-
cation. Contiguous physical ranges, or BARs (base-address-regions), are re-
served by the hardware, and hardware transparently redirects loads and stores
to those regions to the device. MMIO is implemented by configuring CPU
registers with metadata describing a base address and length based on the
system memory address map, which is configured by the BIOS (or UEFI) at
boot. MMIO accesses are forwarded to the PCIe root complex, converted to
PCIe packets, and routed to the GPU. Modern GPUs use MMIO BARs to
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expose hardware registers for configuring the device and frequently accessed
onboard device memory, e.g., command queues for controlling computation.
DMA enables the GPU hardware to directly access CPU memory with-
out the help of the CPU, using address translation through a host-configured
IOMMU to implement memory protection and ensure the device only reads
and writes data belonging to the application it is serving. GPUs rely on DMA
for bulk data transfer.
The host hypervisor and operating system control the PCIe bus, which
routes packets to multiple devices connected to the PCIe root complex in a tree
topology. Packets in transit to/from the GPU may be visible to other devices.
Privileged host software may change the routing topology dynamically and
install pseudo-devices that allow it to sniff traffic. Securing communication
with the GPU must defend against these passive and active PCIe attacks.
Applications use GPUs through high-level, vendor-provided APIs such
as CUDA [NVIa] and HIP [HIP]; they include a user-level runtime and OS-
level driver that communicate through a combination of ioctl system calls
and memory-mapped command queues. The driver is responsible for creating
mappings from virtual memory to physical MMIO regions. After these privi-
leged operations are complete, any software that has a mapping (user or OS)
may communicate directly with the device using registers or command queues
exposed through the MMIO regions.
While memory management, synchronization, and other features (e.g.,
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IPC and power management) require interaction with the driver state (e.g.,
creating and managing memory mappings), workloads that pre-allocate all of
their required GPU memory and use only data transfer and kernel launch
primitives can function completely by writing commands into the GPU’s com-
mand queue. It is possible to construct and submit these commands without
referring to any state maintained by either the runtime or the driver.
3.3.2 GPU Trusted Execution Environments
While there are no GPU TEEs available on the market today, Gravi-
ton [VVB18] is a detailed proposal from the literature that provides the basic
functionality that any GPU TEE (or indeed any TEE) should provide. Gravi-
ton provides secrecy for GPU code and input data, integrity for the GPU com-
putation, and remote attestation for the computation’s initial state. Graviton
achieves most of its functionality by changing the GPU firmware, so it does not
require extensive changes to the GPU hardware itself. Modern GPU firmware
runs on a fully programmable control processor [NVIc], making Graviton’s
changes achievable. We explain GPU TEE functionality by saying what the
GPU does, but the implementation could be firmware, hardware, or both.
A secure channel ensures the integrity, secrecy, and ordering of the
commands sent to the GPU. Before computation begins, the client machine
and the GPU agree on a shared symmetric key via a key exchange protocol
(e.g., Diffie-Hellman). The client uses this key to send commands using a
protocol like transport layer security (TLS), which provides a secure channel.
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The GPU assures the integrity of the computation. The GPU attests
the initial execution conditions to the remote user, who can verify that the
provider initialized the GPU with code and data loaded into the expected ad-
dress ranges with the expected permissions and that the hardware generating
the attestation is genuine. There are many variations on remote attestation,
but it is a common feature for modern enclaves like SGX [CD16] and Key-
stone [LKC+18].
The GPU divides its memory into untrusted and trusted regions (rem-
iniscent of SGX’s EPC). The untrusted host OS or Hypervisor can DMA into
untrusted GPU memory, enabling efficient data transfers; the GPU can then
copy data between untrusted GPU memory and trusted memory. This mech-
anism provides GPU memory protection even though the IOMMU is under
control of the untrusted kernel. Graviton disables unified memory, allowing
privileged CPU code to demand page GPU memory and exposes side-channel
memory access information.
The GPU TEE should turn off or refuse to report the state of any per-
formance counters. Recent GPU side-channel attacks [NNQAG18, FGBR18]
have successfully used timing data from GPU performance counters. Similarly,
the GPU TEE should avoid reporting the values of physical sensors such as
temperature or power use. These sensors can leak information about execution
since the GPU draws different amount of power or generates different amounts
of heat depending on the workload. Preventing programmatic access to sensors
does not prevent an adversary from measuring these properties externally; to
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defend against an adversary with that power would require orthogonal tech-
niques not discussed here.
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Chapter 4
Ryoan: A Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted
Computation on Secret Data
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) prevent public cloud providers
from directly observing secret data during execution, but they do nothing to
prevent code inside the TEE from divulging secrets. While this is not a prob-
lem when the data owner controls (or can vet) TEE code, it is a problem for
the vast majority of public-cloud-hosted applications. Data-processing services
like image editing (Pixlr [Pix]), tax preparation (TurboTax [Int]), and personal
health analyses (23andMe [23ab]) are often composed of proprietary code con-
trolled and deployed by third parties. Vetting code is not an option for these
services since their source code contains secrets that the service providers want
to protect.
This chapter is based on the previous publication: “Ryoan: A Distributed Sandbox
for Untrusted Computation on Secret data”, by Tyler Hunt, Zhiting Zhu, Yuanzhong Xu,
Simon Peter, and Emmett Witchel in the ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS),
Vol.35, No.4, December 2018 [HZX+18]. That publication is an expanded version of the
original work which was published with the same title and authors in the proceedings 12th
USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), Savannah,
Georgia, USA, November, 2016 [HZX+16]. My contributions to these publications include
designing the Ryoan execution model and contributing to its implementation, porting Native
Client to SGX, implementing copy-on-write checkpointing, building the image processing
application, and evaluating the performance overheads.
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User inputs to data-processing services are often sensitive, such as tax
documents and health data, which creates a dilemma for the user. If users want
to keep their data secret, they either have to give up using the services or hope
that they can be trusted. Without additional mechanisms, there is nothing to
prevent service software from leaking data (intentionally or unintentionally)
beyond the confines of a TEE.
Companies providing data-processing services for users often wish to
outsource part of the computation to third-party cloud services, a practice
called “software as a service (SaaS).” SaaS encourages the decomposition of
problems into specialized pieces that the service providers can assemble on
behalf of a user. For instance, 23andMe might want to combine thier health
expertise with Amazon’s machine learning expertise and robust cloud infras-
tructure. However, 23andMe now finds itself a user of Amazon’s machine
learning service and faces the same dilemma—it must disclose proprietary cor-
relations between health data and various diseases to use Amazon’s machine
learning service. In these scenarios, the owner of secret data has no control
over the data-processing service.
We propose Ryoan1, a distributed sandbox that allows users to keep
their data secret in data-processing services, without trusting the software
stack, developers, or administrators of these services. First, Ryoan provides
sandbox instances to confine individual data-processing modules and prevent
1Ryoan is a sandbox, and its name is inspired by a famous dry landscape Zen garden
that stimulates contemplation (Ryōan-ji).
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them from leaking data; second, Ryoan uses TEEs to allow a remote user
to verify the integrity of the sandbox instances and protect their execution;
third, Ryoan allows confined code modules to communicate in controlled ways,
enabling flexible delegation among mutually distrustful parties.
Ryoan faces issues beyond those faced by TEE-based shielding systems
such as Haven [BPH15]. TEEs protect an application that the user trusts and
does not collude with the infrastructure. In Ryoan’s threat model, neither the
application nor the infrastructure is under the user’s control. The applica-
tion and the infrastructure may try to steal the user’s secrets by colluding via
covert channels—even if the application itself is isolated from the provider’s
infrastructure using enclave protection. Ryoan’s goal is to prevent such covert
channels and stop an untrusted application from intentionally and covertly us-
ing users’ data to modulate events like system call arguments or I/O patterns,
which are visible to the infrastructure.
Ryoan confines untrusted modules that make up an untrusted applica-
tion. Confining untrusted code is a longstanding problem that remains tech-
nically challenging [Lam73]. Ryoan meets the challenges of confinement by
taking advantage of hardware-supported enclave protection and assuming a
request-oriented data model. Confined modules only process input once and
can neither read nor write persistent storage after receiving the input. This
model limits Ryoan’s applicability to request-oriented server applications—
but such servers are the most common way to bring scalable, data-processing
services to large numbers of users.
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Ryoan uses multiple instances of a trusted sandbox to confine an appli-
cation. We based the trusted sandbox used in the Ryoan prototype on Native
Client (NaCl) [YSD+09, SMB+10], a state-of-the-art, user-level sandbox (it
can be built as a standalone binary, independent from the browser). NaCl
uses compiler-based techniques to confine untrusted code rather than relying
on address space separation, a property necessary to be compatible with SGX
enclaves2. The Ryoan sandbox safeguards secrets by controlling explicit I/O
channels, and covert channels such as system call traces and data sizes.
The Ryoan prototype uses SGX to provide hardware enclaves. Each
SGX enclave contains a sandbox instance that loads and executes untrusted
modules. The sandbox instances communicate with each other to form a dis-
tributed sandbox that enforces strong privacy guarantees for all participating
parties—the users and different service providers. Ryoan provides taint labels
(similar to secrecy labels from DIFC [ML97]) that users and service providers
define, allowing them to ensure that Ryoan confines any module that processes
their secrets.
Contributions. Ryoan’s security goal is simple: prevent leakage of secret
data. However, confining services over which the user has no control is chal-
lenging without a centralized trusted platform. We make the following contri-
butions:
2“Enclave” is what Intel calls an SGX TEE
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 A new execution model that allows mutually distrustful parties to
process sensitive data in a distributed fashion on untrusted infrastructure.
 The design and implementation of a prototype distributed sandbox
that confines untrusted code modules (possibly on different machines) and
enforces I/O policies that prevent leakage of secrets.
 Several case studies of real-world application scenarios to demon-
strate how they benefit from the secrecy guarantees of Ryoan, including an
image processing system, an email spam/virus filter, a personal health analy-
sis tool, and a machine translator.
 Evaluation of our prototype’s performance characteristics by measur-
ing the execution overheads of each of its building blocks: the SGX enclave,
confinement, and checkpoint/rollback. The evaluation is based on both SGX
hardware and simulation.
Application limitations. Ryoan forces applications to adopt a request-
oriented data model. This data model is sufficient for batch processing of
mostly unique inputs. There are application behaviors that do not map
cleanly—or at all—onto Ryoan’s data model. Below are classes of applica-
tion behavior that Ryoan does not support.
Storage. Ryoan is not suited for storage; it is intended to safeguard compu-
tation on sensitive inputs. Once a Ryoan module has seen user data, Ryoan
prevents the module from writing to persistent storage.
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Network metadata. Ryoan takes no steps to protect network connection
metadata like the user’s IP address or the length of packets. Ryoan protects
user data but does not protect connection metadata (though systems exist
that protect connection metadata, e.g., Tor [DMS04] hides a client’s network
address from the server).
Repeated computations on the same/similar input data. Ryoan can-
not eliminate all timing channels, but it does mitigate their effects with its
request-oriented data model. For services that repeatedly process the same or
very similar inputs, Ryoan might leak too much confidential information. For
example, some online photo services intend for users to repeatedly read and
edit photos. Ryoan is not well suited for these services because with enough
repeated input, untrusted modules can exfiltrate the input data.
Multi-user computation. If a single request contains secrets from multiple,
mutually distrusting users, Ryoan cannot isolate them. Ryoan tracks data
flows at a request granularity, and applications are free to mix data within
a single request, even if that data comes from different, mutually distrusting
users.
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4.1 Ryoan’s speciation of the malicious public cloud
threat model
We consider multiple, mutually distrustful parties involved in data-
processing services. A service provider is not trusted by the users of the service
to keep data secret; if the service provider outsources part of the computation
to other service providers, it becomes a user of those service providers and does
not trust them to provide secrecy either. Each service provider can deploy its
software on its computational platform, or use a third-party cloud platform
that no service provider trusts. We assume that users and providers trust their
code and platform, but do not trust each other’s code or platforms. Everyone
must trust Ryoan and SGX.
A service provider might be the same as its computational platform
provider, and the two might collude to steal secrets from their input data. Be-
sides directly communicating data, the untrusted code may use covert channels
via software interfaces, such as system call sequences and arguments, to com-
municate bits from the user’s input to the platform.
Ryoan takes no steps to prevent each party from leaking its own secrets
intentionally or via bugs. This model is suited for the case where the service
provider deploys code on its own computational platform (see section 4.3.3 for
more discussion). When executing on the platform of another provider, Ryoan
provides protections against a malicious OS. For instance, Ryoan validates
system calls to prevent Iago attacks [CS13] (similar to Haven [BPH15], Ink-
tag [HKD+13], Sego [KDL+16], SCONE [ATG+16], and Graphene-SGX [TPV17]),
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and encrypts communication to protect data secrecy. Application design-
ers may use orthogonal techniques [RLT15, CVDBDS09, CDE08, ZWC+13,
KMPS11] to mitigate the unintentional disclosure of application secrets. Simi-
larly, we assume computational platform providers are responsible for protect-
ing their own secrets (e.g., the administrator’s password).
Although we consider covert channels based on software interfaces like
system calls, we do not consider side or covert channels based on hardware lim-
itations (§3.2.2) or execution time. Untrusted enclaves can leak bits by mod-
ulating their cache accesses, page accesses, execution time, etc. Such chan-
nels are themselves technically difficult and often require dedicated systems
to address adequately [LCW13, ZAM12, KPMR12, CLD16, FWZ+16]. Many
well-regarded secure system designs factor-out side/covert channels based on
hardware limitations or execution time, at least to some degree [VEK+07,ZB-
wKM06,LGV+09,PBR+14,BPH15], because doing so enables progress in de-
signing and building secure systems. While we do not claim to prevent the
execution-time channel, Ryoan does limit the use of this channel to once per
request (see section 4.3.1 for a more robust explanation).
4.2 Native Client background
Google Native Client (NaCl) [YSD+09,SMB+10] is a sandbox for run-
ning Arm/x86/x86-64 native code (a NaCl module) using software fault iso-
lation. NaCl consists of a verifier and a service runtime. Application code is
compiled by a specialized compiler that lays out instructions in a way that can
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be easily validated by the verifier, so the compiler need not be trusted. The
verifier disassembles the binary and validates the disassembled instructions as
being safe to execute, to guarantee that the untrusted module cannot break
out of NaCl’s SFI sandbox.
NaCl executes system calls on behalf of the loaded application. System
calls in the application transfer control to the NaCl runtime, which determines
the proper action. Ryoan cannot allow the application to use its system calls to
pass information to the underlying operating system. For example, if Ryoan
passed read system calls from the application directly to the platform, the
application could use the size and number of the calls to encode information
about the secret data it is processing. We discuss the details of the confinement
provided by Ryoan in Section 4.3.5.
Rowhammer attacks. Attackers can use rowhammer attacks from confined
code to break older versions of the NaCl sandbox [KDK+14]. In a rowhammer
attack, the adversary forces the processor to write a cache line back to memory
rapidly, flipping bits in otherwise unwriteable memory locations. Modifying
normally protected memory allows untrusted code to break NaCl’s sandbox by
violating its invariants. Newer versions of NaCl disallow CLFLUSH instructions,
a core mechanism used in the original rowhammer attack [KDK+14]. There
have been successful rowhammer attacks against NaCl using non-temporal
stores [QS16] (and NaCl forbade non-temporal stores in response).
Regardless of NaCl’s vulnerability to rowhammer attacks, any rowham-
32
mer attack mounted against an SGX enclave would cause memory integrity
checks to fail when an affected cache line was read [JLLK17]. Thus any
rowhammer attack mounted by code inside our outside the enclave becomes a
denial-of-service attack (out of scope).
Spectre and meltdown attacks. Native Client’s sandboxing mechanisms
prevent sandboxed code from mounting the Meltdown [LSG+18] attack. Melt-
down requires the attacker to issue memory operations for kernel addresses,
which become arguments to speculatively executed instructions; Native Client
restricts the memory addresses that untrusted code can only reference a 4GB
range, which never overlaps with kernel addresses.
Native Client’s sandboxing mechanisms also make it more challenging
to mount Spectre attacks. Spectre attacks rely on the attacker’s ability to
train the hardware branch predictor. The attacker trains the branch predictor
to make wrong predictions during the execution of the victim. Confined Na-
tive Client code is always position-independent, and the targets of its indirect
branches must be aligned blocks within a 4GB range. These measures reduce
the attacker’s freedom in manipulating the branch predictor, thereby shrinking
the attack surface.
4.3 Design
Ryoan is a distributed sandbox that executes a directed acyclic graph












Figure 4.1: One of several sandbox instances that make up a Ryoan deploy-
ment. The privileged software includes an operating system and an optional
hypervisor.
Ryoan’s primary job is to prevent the modules from communicating any se-
cret data outside the confines of the system (including external hosts and the
platform’s privileged software).
A module consists of code, initialized data, and the maximum size of
dynamically allocated memory. For backward compatibility, Ryoan modules
support programs written for libc, including fully compiled languages and
runtimes built on top of libc. A Ryoan module can be a Linux program, or
it could contain a library operating system [BPH15]. SGX disallows ring 0
execution in enclaves, so Ryoan cannot directly support an operating system
or hypervisor.
Confining modules without trusting privileged software (i.e., the op-
erating system and hypervisor) is Ryoan’s chief technical challenge. In the








Figure 4.2: The Ryoan chain of trust. SGX hardware attests that a valid
sandbox instance is executing (Hash) with an intended SGX configuration
(Meta). The sandbox instance ensures that it loaded the expected binary with
a signed hash from the software provider (gray).
The possibility of collusion forces Ryoan to consider any behavior visible to
privileged software (henceforth externally visible behavior) to be a potential
channel for leaking secrets.
Figure 4.1 shows a single instance of the distributed sandbox. A princi-
pal (e.g., a company providing software as a service) can contribute a module
that Ryoan loads and confines, enabling the module to operate on secret data
safely. We will refer to any principle that provides a module as a module
provider. The NaCl sandbox uses a load-time code validator to ensure that
the module cannot violate the sandbox by accessing memory outside its ad-
dress range or making system calls without Ryoan intervention.
Ryoan assures its secrecy and integrity by executing in hardware-protected
enclaves provided by SGX. Hardware attests to Ryoan’s initial state, and in
doing so, hardware becomes the anchor for Ryoan’s chain of trust (Figure 4.2).
SGX generates an unforgeable remote attestation for the user that a sandbox
instance executes in an enclave on the platform. The user can establish an
encrypted channel that they know terminates within that sandbox instance.
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SGX guarantees the enclave cryptographic secrecy and integrity against ma-
nipulation by privileged software.
A master enclave creates all sandbox instances, and they establish cryp-
tographically protected communication channels among themselves as speci-
fied by the user. Once the providers have instantiated the modules, the master
forwards attestations for each module to the user. The user verifies that the
configuration matches their specifications. Then the user inputs their secret
data. Ryoan provides simple labels to protect secret data added by modules in
the DAG (§4.3.3). All Ryoan’s sandbox instances form a distributed sandbox
that protects secret input data from being leaked by the untrusted modules
that operate on it.
Ryoan prevents modules from leaking sensitive data by decoupling ex-
ternally visible behaviors from the content of secret data. Anything the module
does in response to input data is in danger of being a side channel that com-
municates it. Ryoan, therefore, makes the module’s externally visible behavior
independent of the input data. SGX hardware limits externally visible behav-
iors to explicit stores to unprotected memory and the use of system services
(system calls). The NaCl toolchain and runtime eliminate unprotected stores.
Ryoan eliminates most system calls by providing their functionality
from within NaCl. For example, Ryoan provides mmap functionality by man-
aging a fixed-sized memory pool within the SGX enclave. However, untrusted
modules must read input and write output, so Ryoan provides a restricted
I/O model that prevents data leaks (e.g., the output size is a fixed function of
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Module property Enforced by Reason
OS cannot access module memory (§3.2.1). SGX Security
Initial module code/data verified (§3.2.1). SGX Security
Can only address module memory (§4.2). NaCl Security
Ryoan intercepts syscalls (§4.2,§4.3.1). NaCl Security
Cannot modify SGX state (§4.3.2). NaCl Security
User defines topology (§4.3.2). Ryoan Security
Data flow tracked by labels (§4.3.3). Ryoan Security
Memory cleaned between requests (§4.3.1). Ryoan Security
Module defines initialized state (§4.3.4). Ryoan Performance
Unconfined initialization (§4.3.2). Ryoan Compatibility
In-memory POSIX API (§4.3.5). Ryoan Compatibility
Table 4.1: Properties Ryoan imposes on untrusted modules, the technology
that enforces them, and the reason Ryoan imposes them.
input size). Table 4.1 summarizes the properties Ryoan imposes on modules
to achieve secure decoupling of observable behavior from secret input data.
Figure 4.4 shows an example of Ryoan processing input from user Alice
whose sensitive data is processed by both 23andMe and Amazon. Each sand-
box instance executes in an enclave on the same or different machines. The
host machine(s) might be provided by 23andMe, Amazon, or a third party. In
all cases, Ryoan assures no leakage of the user’s secrets and prevents leakage
of any trade secrets used by 23andMe and Amazon.
4.3.1 Restricted I/O model
In most cases, Ryoan disallows access to or replaces system services
to eliminate module-controlled externally visible behaviors. However, Ryoan
cannot replace I/O, so it must be allowed in some form (since Ryoan does not
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control devices directly). Instead of replacing it, Ryoan enforces a restricted
I/O model upon modules. The I/O model ensures that data flow is always
independent of the input data; Ryoan never moves data in response to requests
of the untrusted module once the module has read its input data. This safety
property is sometimes called data obliviousness [OSF+16].
Ryoan requires modules to be request oriented: input can be any size,
but each input is an application-defined “unit of work.” For example, a unit of
work can be an email when classifying spam or a complete file when scanning
for viruses. Each module gets a single opportunity to process a single unit of
work. After generating output, the module must be destroyed (or reset, see
§ 4.3.4) to prevent it from sending the secrets of one user to another, or using
the processing time of future requests to leak information about past requests
(see § 4.3.1 for a full discussion).
Units of work can be any size, but Ryoan ensures that data flow pat-
terns do not leak secrets from input data by making module output size a fixed,
application-defined function of the input size. Ryoan protects communication
with the following rules: (1) Each sandbox instance reads its entire input from
every input-connected sandbox instance before the module starts processing.
(2) The size of the output is a fixed function of the input size, specified as
part of the DAG. Sandbox instances pad or truncate all outputs to the exact
length determined by the function. (3) Each sandbox instance is notified by its
module when its output is complete, and it writes the module’s output to all
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Figure 4.3: Ryoan’s distributed sandbox. Modules contributed by principals–
in this case, the platform providers, 23andMe and Amazon–are confined to
process users’ data safely.
output in a message that contains metadata that describes what part of the
message is module output and what part is padding (if any). Receiving sand-
box instances interpret metadata and remove any padding before exposing the
data to its module. These rules are sufficient because they ensure that output
traffic is independent of input data (though there are possible alternatives, for
example, each request could specify its output size).
Consider the scenario in Figure 4.3. Each input comes from a user.
The user can choose to leak the input size or hide it by padding the input.
The description of the application specifies that (1) Ryoan pads the output
of 23andMe’s first module to a fixed size defined by 23andMe which can hold
the largest possible user input, (2) the output of Amazon Machine Learning’s
classifier module is padded to a fixed size to encode the classification result, and
(3) Ryoan also pads the response to the user from 23andMe’s second module,
this time to a fixed size that can hold the largest possible result. Each sandbox
instance must receive the complete input of a work unit before executing its
module.
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Ryoan ensures that output size is a fixed function of the input, so it is
a module’s mistake if it is not large enough. Ryoan will truncate outputs that
are too large and pad outputs that are too small. However, a module author
should be able to describe the maximum possible output for a given input-
request size. For example, a spam detector’s output will be the input mail
message plus a constant size sufficient to hold the spam rating for the email.
For many tasks, it is easy to bound the size of the output based on the input.
For example, it is straightforward to bound the size of a machine learning
model with a known topology for a known task with known training data, or
to bound the size of a translation from one human language to another.
Processing-time channels. While Ryoan carefully controls I/O, the mod-
ule controls the amount of time it takes to carry out its computation. A module
could use this fact to construct a timing channel by varying the length of time
it takes to generate an output based on secrets in the input data. Ryoan takes
the following steps to limit leaks through processing time channels:
 One shot at input data. Ryoan allows each module to process its input
data exactly once, with no opportunity to carry forward state from one input to
the next. This one-shot policy limits data leakage. Ryoan enforces the one-shot
policy by (1) requiring that the data processing topology be a DAG to avoid
cycles; (2) disallowing access to any state modified by processing a different
unit of work; (3) preventing input replay attacks by re-initializing all secure
connections if any connection is ever broken. Secure communication protocols
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contain protection against replay attacks [YL08], so the re-initializing of broken
links prevents input replay. Note that the OS can pause or stop the execution of
an SGX enclave, but it cannot roll back its state [Int14], which means the cloud
provider cannot roll back the state of a secure connection. Ryoan itself uses
high-quality randomness available via the processor’s RDRAND instruction to
establish secure connections, which does not rely on the OS.
 Randomness. Users can specify whether confined modules need ac-
cess to randomness. If the user allows, a module can access randomness via the
processor, e.g., Intel’s RDRAND instruction. Ryoan does not allow confined
modules to get randomness from the operating system. Access to randomness
means a malicious module can leak random bits from an input, for example,
by choosing an input bit at random and leaking it using its processing time. If
the user repeats input data, a malicious module with access to randomness can
eventually leak the entire input over its processing-time channel, even though
it only leaks once for each input unit of work. Using a fixed processing time
eliminates this channel.
Some natural types of input data can function as a source of randomness. If
a computation’s input contains ever-changing metadata (e.g., an embedded
timestamp of the request), then a confined module can use these changing bits
to seed a pseudo-random number generator and leak multiple bits from the
semantically identical input. Just like users must take care to prevent leaking
the size of their input data, they must also take care to avoid semantically
identical inputs encoded into different bit representations.
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Below are other design choices that would provide stronger leak miti-
gation. They are not part of the prototype.
 Fixed processing time. Timing channels can be eliminated by forc-
ing a fixed processing time whose length is determined before the module has
seen any data. The OS cannot directly determine when the module completes,
and thus the Ryoan runtime can pad execution time by busy waiting. How-
ever, controlling its timing without the cooperation of the operating system
is a challenge. Fixed processing time can be quite expensive for computa-
tions with widely variable run times because all run times would be padded
to the worst case. However, fixed processing time can be quite modest for
computations with highly predictable run times (e.g., evaluating certain ma-
chine learning models like decision trees) or light throughput requirements.
Fixed-time execution does not leak information, though we defer to future
work building a sandbox instance that supports it. Execution time could also
be a fixed-function of input length, to add flexibility with no loss of security.
 Quantized processing time. Reducing the granularity of potential
processing times helps to mitigate processing time channels. Systems do
this by padding execution to a fixed number of quantized, pre-defined val-
ues [TLW+09, ZAM11, AZM10, ZAM12]. Because Ryoan only allows mod-
ules to see sensitive data once, enforcing quantized execution would limit the
amount of data individual modules can leak to the logarithm of the number
allowed execution durations. For instance, if the code terminates after one of
eight different statically determined intervals, it leaks three bits.
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4.3.2 Secure initialization
Ryoan’s secure initialization ensures that modules are loaded correctly
by genuine sandbox instances in the specified topology for a particular applica-
tion. A Ryoan application is described by a DAG specification, which specifies
how modules should be connected (always a DAG for safety, see § 4.3.1). The
user either defines the DAG specification or explicitly approves it.
Initializing the application. A bootstrap enclave (which we will call the
master) receives the DAG specification to start initialization. Upon receiving
the DAG specification, the master requests that the platform instantiate en-
claves that contain sandbox instances for modules listed in the specification.
Different machines or even different providers can host these enclaves. The
master uses attestation to verify each sandbox instance’s validity, then informs
the sandbox instances of the location of their neighbors in the DAG specifica-
tion. Sandbox instances establish cryptographically protected communication
channels via key exchange with their neighbors using the appropriate untrusted
communication medium (e.g., the network or local inter-process communica-
tion) as transport.
The user can verify the master’s validity via attestation and ask whether
the provider has initialized the desired topology. If this is true, the user estab-
lishes secure channels with the entry and exit sandbox instances of the DAG,
and data processing begins.
The master is convenient but not essential to our design. The only
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requirement is that the user receives some statement, attested to by hardware,
that the cloud provider did not misbehave. For instance, instead, the sandbox
instances themselves could act as a kind of decentralized master and forward
attestations of their neighbors to the user.
Ryoan identity and module identity. SGX attests to the sandbox in-
stances using processor hardware, and the sandbox instances, in turn, attest
to the modules’ initial state using software cryptography (Figure 4.2). SGX
supports two forms of identity, one based on a hash of the enclave’s initial
state (MRENCLAVE) and one based on a public key, product identifier, and
security version number (MRSIGNER). SGX can verify Ryoan using either
form of identity; our prototype uses MRENCLAVE. Ryoan can support soft-
ware analogs of either identity for untrusted modules; the prototype identifies
modules by the public key that signs them.
Module initialization. A sandbox instance begins by verifying that its
module matches the DAG specification. Upon successful verification, the sand-
box instance continues by loading and validating its module. Successfully val-
idated modules are allowed to initialize. While initializing, the module is not
confined and has full access to the system services exposed by vanilla NaCl.
Non-confined initialization makes module creation more efficient, and it makes
porting easier because the initialization code can remain unchanged. Mod-
ules signal Ryoan when initialization is complete by calling wait_for_work,
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a routine implemented by Ryoan. Once a module is initialized, it processes
a request, generates its output, and then is destroyed or reset to prevent the
accumulation of secret data.
Ryoan module validation ensures that modules are safe to execute by
enforcing a set of constraints on the loaded code. Ryoan uses NaCl’s load-
time code validator to ensure that the module’s code adheres to a strict for-
mat. NaCl’s code format is designed to be efficiently verified and efficiently
sandboxed, restricting control flow targets and cleanly separating code from
data. Memory accesses are confined to remain within the address space oc-
cupied by the module, including execution fetches. The detailed guarantees
of NaCl are available as prior work [YSD+09, SMB+10], and Ryoan does not
change the base guarantees of the NaCl sandbox. Ryoan adds the constraints
that modules may not contain any SGX instructions, and that control flow
is constrained to the initial module code, i.e., Ryoan disallows dynamic code
generation.
Sandbox instance migration. To balance server utilization, Ryoan might
periodically reconfigure the deployment of the data processing DAG. Because
Ryoan processes secret data once, it does not maintain or migrate any per-
sistent state. However, modules might maintain persistent data, for example,
databases for initialization. Ryoan makes no guarantees about a module’s per-
sistent state; module providers should consider their trust relationship with the
platform provider before depending on the fidelity of any state stored by the
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platform. If a module stores persistent data, then the service provider is ex-
pected to make that data available to the module when it is re-initialized after
migration, e.g., storing it in a distributed data store accessible on the new
node.
The Ryoan prototype only supports the most coarse-grained migration
achieved by shutting down the processing DAG and recreating it on a new set
of nodes. Should migration become a frequent operation, the maser enclave
could coordinate migration as an optimization, e.g., it could migrate only
certain nodes in the DAG.
4.3.3 Protecting module provider secrets
Ryoan uses security labels to prevent module provider secrets from
flowing back to the user. Conceptually, a label is a set of tags, where each tag
is an opaque identifier drawn from a vast universe that identifies a principal,
indicating secrets from this principal. Ryoan uses public keys as tags. Ryoan
assigns the user’s tag to any data provided by the user. Module binaries are
signed; a loaded module’s tag is the public key, which correctly verifies the
signature on its binary. A module provider could use different key pairs to
sign its module binaries, enabling privilege separation.
Ryoan adapts previous label-based systems to enable multiple mutu-
ally distrustful modules to process sensitive data cooperatively. Ryoan la-
bels are similar to labels in DIFC systems [ML97, VEK+07, PBR+14, ZB-
wKM06, KYB+07, LGV+09, PBR+14], but are far simpler. Ryoan labels are
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only used to reason about data secrecy (not integrity), and are coarse-grained;
Ryoan applies labels to entire modules and the data they generate. Ryoan’s
use of labels could also be thought of as taint tracking [CPG+04] at enclave-
level granularity, with per-principal taint classes. Taint is attached to data at
the unit of work granularity (where the units of work are application-defined).
Label manipulation rules. Each module is created with an empty label,
and can add or remove a single tag that corresponds to its principal — each
module can declassify its own secrets. When a module reads data with a
non-empty label (e.g., from a user or another module’s output), the module’s
label is replaced with the union of the data’s label and the module’s old label.
Ryoan marks a module’s output data with the module’s label.
In Figure 4.4, Alice’s input is labeled with their tag, and the first
23andMe module adds the 23andMe tag, to make sure that its secrets cannot
flow back to the user after handing them off to Amazon’s machine learning
module. This control is essential since the user is in control of the topology.
The second 23andMe module removes its tag from its output’s data label.
In a sense, 23andMe’s public key creates a group, and both modules
are members of the group—verified by Ryoan because 23andMe signed both
modules with that key. Ryoan is trusted to remove the user’s tag when it
communicates over a protected and authenticated connection to the user.
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Non-confining labels. If a module’s label does not contain tags from other
principals, the module is not confined. Such labels are called non-confining
labels. A module with a non-confining label may perform any file system
operation, network communication, or address space modification permitted
by Ryoan and NaCl. For example, it can freely initialize its state by reading
from the network or file system. Ryoan allows unfettered access to external
resources because the principal’s tag means that the module may have seen
secrets only from itself. In Ryoan’s threat model, each principal trusts their
module not to leak their secrets (§4.1) and to validate any data it receives from
an untrustworthy source.
In many DIFC systems, principals are independent of the application
code, e.g., multiple users (principals) use the same wiki Web application, and
the users do not trust the application [VEK+07,PBR+14,ZBwKM06,KYB+07,
LGV+09]. Ryoan allows application owners (module providers) to be princi-
pals who trust their own code, which is different from the standard DIFC
model. Although a module provider’s code may have bugs that cause it to
release its own secrets in its output, that is not within the threat model for
Ryoan and can be mitigated using orthogonal techniques (§4.1). Ryoan pro-
tects a principal’s data when it is processed by modules that are not under the
principal’s control.
A module provider can host its modules and secret data on its machines
to protect them. However, if it chooses to use a third-party computational
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Figure 4.4: Sandbox instances manage labels on data and modules. The user’s
tag is propagated to all modules, making them confined after receiving input;
for example, Ryoan keeps 23andMe’s tag when it outsources to Amazon Ma-
chine Learning to prevent leaking 23andMe’s secrets.
need encryption to protect persistent secrets from the platform. Ryoan uses the
SGX sealing feature to store secret data on behalf of modules. Sealing provides
an encryption key only accessible to enclaves with the same identity executing
on the same processor. For Ryoan, all enclaves contain sandbox instances and
have the same identity. The module passes any data that it wants to persist
securely to Ryoan, which adds metadata, including the module’s public key.
Ryoan seals the data and metadata and writes the result into a file. The
metadata allows Ryoan to persist data on behalf of different modules and
allows it to restrict any module’s access to its data.
Confining labels. When a module’s label contains tags of other principals
(as a result of receiving secrets from a user or another module’s output), Ryoan
confines it. We call such labels confining labels. A confining label indicates
the module may have seen the secrets of other principals; Ryoan must prevent
the module from leaking those secrets.
Ryoan prevents modules with confining labels from persisting data.
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As a result, Ryoan’s label system is far simpler than DIFC systems [VEK+07,
ZBwKM06,PBR+14,KYB+07,ML97]. Confined modules have seen secret data
from other principals, so allowing them persistent storage violates Ryoan’s
“one-shot” request-oriented data model—a module processes a request once
and only once.
4.3.4 Optimizing module reset
The restrictions necessary to confine modules create execution time and
memory space overheads. In this section, we discuss strategies for mitigating
these overheads.
Checkpoint-based enclave reset. Creating and initializing modules often
requires far more CPU time than processing a single request (see Section 5.6
for measurements). For instance, loading the data necessary for virus scanning
takes 24 seconds, orders of magnitude greater than the ≈0.124 seconds it takes
to process a single email. Ryoan manages the module lifecycle efficiently using
a checkpoint-based enclave reset.
Creating and initializing a hardware protected enclave is slow (e.g.,
we measured 30 ms for a small enclave). Compounding the problem is that
applications often do not optimize their initialization sequence because they
assume that it will not be executed frequently. However, Ryoan does not allow
any data from one input unit of work to be carried forward to the next. Each
input requires that the computation begins from the same, non-secret state,
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making initialization a bottleneck.
Ryoan provides a checkpoint service that rolls back the application to
an untainted, but initialized, memory state (Figure 4.5). In our prototype, this
state is at the first invocation of wait_for_work. Ryoan does not allow an
enclave that has seen secret input to be checkpointed, because its data model
is request-oriented: modules cannot depend on data from past requests to
operate. Checkpointing a module that has seen secret data would (potentially)
give that module multiple execution opportunities on a single request’s unit of
work.
Checkpoint restore allows Ryoan to save the cost of tearing down and
rebuilding the SGX enclave, and it saves the cost of executing the application’s
initialization code. Ryoan takes checkpoints once but restores the checkpoint
after each request is processed. Therefore, Ryoan makes a full copy of the
module’s writeable state and simply tracks which pages get modified (avoiding
a memory copy during processing); Ryoan only needs restore the contents of
modified pages (§4.4.6). SGX provides a way for enclave code to verify page
permissions and be reliably notifies the enclave about memory faults, which is
necessary to track modified pages.
Batch requests before a reset. A user might want more efficiency by
allowing a module to process several input units of work before reset. Whether
batching multiple inputs within a single request constitutes a threat is user
and application dependent. However, if a module can process more than one
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Figure 4.5: Sandbox instance lifecycle: unoptimized vs. checkpoint-based.
unit of work from the same data source, it can accumulate secrets across
multiple wait-process-output cycles. Access to more secret data for longer
periods exacerbates the problem of slow leaks (e.g., timing channel leaks). For
example, an email-filtering module allowed to process multiple emails without
resetting could leak multiple bits of a password contained in one email by using
the processing-time channel across multiple wait-process-output cycles.
4.3.5 Ryoan’s confined environment
Any module with a confining label executes in Ryoan’s confined envi-
ronment. Ryoan’s confined environment is intended to prevent information
leakage while reducing porting effort. In order to allow code developed for
general-purpose computing environments to be used within Ryoan, the trusted
Ryoan runtime can provide backward compatibility services. When a module
receives the secret data contained within a request, it enters the confined en-
vironment and loses the ability to communicate with the untrusted OS via
any system call. Therefore, Ryoan provides a system API sufficient for most
legacy programs to perform their function without modification. Ryoan pro-
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vides these services:
 The most important service is an in-memory virtual file system.
First, Ryoan allows users to preload files into module memory. The list of
preloaded files must be determined before the module is confined, e.g., they
can be listed in the DAG specification, or requested by the module during
initialization. Ryoan presents POSIX-compatible APIs to access preloaded
files that are available even after the module is confined. Second, a confined
module can create temporary files and directories (Ryoan keeps them in en-
clave memory). When the module is destroyed or reset, Ryoan destroys all
temporary files and directories and reverts all changes to preloaded files.
 mmap calls are essential to satisfy dynamic memory allocation, so
Ryoan supports anonymous memory mappings by returning addresses from a
pre-allocated memory region. The module must decide the maximum size of
that region before it becomes confined.
Ryoan’s confined environment is sufficient for many data-processing
tasks. For example, ClamAV–a popular virus scanning tool–loads the entire
virus database during initialization; when scanning the input such as a PDF
file, it creates temporary files to store objects extracted from the PDF. Ryoan’s
in-memory file system satisfies these requirements.
However, if an application needs a large database that does not fit in
memory when processing data, Ryoan cannot support it as a single module.
A workaround would be to partition the database and use multiple modules
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to load different partitions and perform different parts of the task if that is
feasible for a particular application.
Any design alternative that allows access to persistent files (as opposed
to Ryoan’s in-memory files) must cope with the covert channel created by
allowing the OS to see file reads, which might occur based on the computation
within the untrusted module. Ryoan eliminates this channel by executing
from memory only. All Ryoan modules must fit into memory for their entire
execution because any “swapping” done by Ryoan will create a covert channel
between the module and the operating system. File access techniques based
on oblivious RAM (ORAM [RFK+15,LHH+15]) can hide data access patterns,
but at a performance and resource cost that we deem too high.
4.3.6 Protecting Ryoan from privileged software
A sandbox instance requires services provided by the untrusted oper-
ating system and possibly the hypervisor. The sandbox instance must check
the results coming from the untrusted operating system to make sure it is not
misbehaving. We inserted most of these checks into libc, which communicates
with the operating system. Ryoan-libc is Ryoan’s replacement for libc, and
it manages system call arguments and checks their return values. The Ryoan
sandbox code invokes Ryoan-libc through standard libc functions, such as
the wrappers for system calls (e.g., read). SCONE [ATG+16] and Graphene-
SGX [TPV17], also modify libc.
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Iago attacks. Ryoan-libc guards against all known Iago attacks [CS13] by
keeping state in enclave memory and carefully checking the results of system
calls, e.g., making sure that addresses returned from mmap do not overlap
with previously allocated memory (like the stack). For Linux, the system
call interface can be secured, e.g., by maintaining semaphore counts in enclave
memory and duplicating futex [FRK02] memory inside and outside the enclave.
Ryoan shares the need for this checking with all systems distrustful of the
operating system [HKD+13,KDL+16,CGL+08], though some check at a lower
level than system calls [BPH15].
Controlling an enclave’s address space. SGX provides user control of
memory mapping, including permissions. Ryoan-libc maintains a data struc-
ture equivalent to the kernel’s list of virtual memory areas (VMAs). It knows
about each mapped region and its permissions. Map requests are fulfilled ea-
gerly and verified by Ryoan-libc at the time of the request (i.e., part of the
mmap call), not at page fault time.
SGX dictates a very specific procedure for verifying enclave mappings.
A typical new mapping proceeds as follows: (1) untrusted code notifies the ker-
nel of a new desired mapping via a system call made by Ryoan-libc; (2) the OS
selects new enclave page frames to satisfy the mapping and modifies the page
tables to map the frames at the requested virtual address with the requested
permissions; (3) untrusted user code resumes and passes control to enclave
code; (4) enclave code verifies that the mapping completed as expected by
55
invoking the SGX instruction EACCEPT on every new page. The EACCEPT in-
struction accepts a virtual address and protection bits and verifies that the
current address space maps that page to a valid, SGX protected 4KB physi-
cal frame. New pages added to the enclave always start with read and write
permissions, and hardware zeros their contents.
If the user wants something other than read and write permission, SGX
provides the EMODPE instruction to make them more permissive and the EMODPR
instruction, which makes them less permissive. EMODPE is only available to en-
clave code while EMODPR is only available to privileged software (ring 0, outside
of the enclave). If an enclave desires less permissive page access rights, it must
signal privileged software to request the restriction. However, it can validate
that it was done correctly through another use of the EACCEPT instruction.
Ryoan-libc emulates mmap behavior by doing work required by SGX
on behalf of the user. For instance, if the user expects new pages to have
particular contents (e.g., the user privately mapped a file) and to be read-only,
Ryoan-libc copies the file into enclave memory and ensures those pages have
read-only permissions before returning.
Rollback. Privileged software can rollback any persistent state. Ryoan does
not depend on any persistent state, preventing rollback attacks by design.
Ryoan also provides mechanisms that allow module providers to avoid depen-
dence on any persistent state. Ryoan’s initialization depends only on its initial
in-memory state, which is protected and attested by hardware. All other state
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is derived from hardware randomness or provided securely at runtime by the
sandbox provider.
A module might use persistent state, for example, during initialization
before seeing any user-supplied secrets. In Figure 4.3, Amazon’s machine learn-
ing classifier might load pre-computed parameters stored in a Ryoan-managed
per-application directory in the local file system. Module providers should
employ encryption, hashing, and rollback protection appropriate to their trust
relationship with the platform provider (and with any provider of information).
Persistent state protection for modules is the module provider’s re-
sponsibility, just as module functionality/correctness is the module provider’s
responsibility. Ryoan guarantees that once a module sees user data, it cannot
leak that data; it does not guarantee that modules act according to specifica-
tions, e.g., that a module correctly identifies spam.
Enclave indistinguishability. While SGX enables enclaves to attest their
integrity to outside parties, nothing prevents the platform from instantiating
multiple copies of enclaves. Ryoan prevents the platform from exploiting this
fact by establishing secure channels between different enclaves and between
enclaves and the user with never-persisted keys, requiring the user or other




The sandbox instance prototype is based on NaCl version 2d5bba1 with
the last upstream commit on Jan 19, 2016. We leverage NaCl’s existing sand-
boxing guarantees to control the module’s access to the platform. NaCl ensures
that the module in the sandbox has no direct access to OS services. We ported
NaCl for use in SGX with the introduction of the Ryoan-libc layer. NaCl de-
pends on libc to interface with the platform. Ryoan-libc makes system calls
on behalf of a sandbox instance after checking that the system call is allowed.
We modified eglibc’s dynamic linker to support loading Ryoan into enclaves,
but all modules must be statically linked. We base Ryoan-libc on eglibc 2.19,
which is compatible with our version of NaCl.
4.4.1 Constraints of current hardware
Ryoan relies on features from Version 2 of the SGX hardware, while
only Version 1 is currently available. Version 2 adds the ability to modify
enclaves dynamically, i.e., augmenting an executing enclave with new memory
and changing protections on existing enclave memory. Ryoan relies on chang-
ing memory protections to implement efficient checkpoint recovery. Further-
more, our first-generation SGX-capable machine makes only a limited amount
of physical memory available to SGX (128MB on our machine).
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4.4.2 Ryoan-libc
Ryoan-libc manages interactions with the untrusted operating system.
The OS cannot read enclave memory, so Ryoan-libc marshals system call ar-
guments into the process’ untrusted memory and copies back results. Interpo-
sition from libc is common for applications that do not trust the operating
system [CGL+08, HKD+13, KDL+16], while Haven protects a smaller system
interface [BPH15].
Fault handling. Signals allow user-level code to be interrupted by the sys-
tem. The sources of most signals are unreliable when the OS is untrusted, but
SGX allows us to get reliable information about memory faults; this allows
Ryoan-libc to expose this information to sandbox instances through the nor-
mal signal handler registration interface. Ryoan-libc signal support is currently
limited to the memory fault signal (SIGSEGV).
After any fault, exception, or interrupt the OS returns control to un-
trusted trampoline code contained within the process. For memory faults,
rather than simply resuming the enclave where it was paused (as in the nor-
mal case), our trampoline code enters the enclave. Inside the enclave, it can
read reliable information about the fault from SGX and make necessary ar-
rangements to fix it (e.g., change permissions). After handling the fault, the
enclave exits, and then our trampoline resumes the enclave at the instruction
that caused the memory fault. We cannot protect the trampoline code from
the OS. However, it can only enter the enclave using the EENTER instruc-
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tion, which will transfer control to our fault-checking entry point, or resume
the enclave using the ERESUME instruction, re-executing the instruction that
faulted. If the OS tries to resume the enclave without calling the enclave fault
handler, the instruction will simply re-fault.
4.4.3 Module address space
x86-64 NaCl allocates an 84 GB region for a NaCl module with 4 GB of
module address space flanked above and below by 40 GB of inaccessible guard
pages. However, current SGX hardware only allows enclaves with 64 GB of
virtual address space. Fortunately, the original x86-64 NaCl design [SMB+10]
overestimated the number of guard pages needed to allow for future changes
in the architecture. A detailed analysis [nac] indicates we can remain safe
by keeping the upper guard region unchanged but reducing the lower region
from 40 GB to 4 GB. Therefore, a sandbox instance requires 48 GB of virtual
address space, which fits into current SGX hardware.
4.4.4 I/O control
A sandbox instance controls its module’s access to files and request
buffers when it is confined, preventing the module from leaking data via direct
syscalls.
In-memory virtual file system. A confined module cannot access the file
system, but Ryoan implements POSIX-compatible APIs for in-memory virtual
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files, including preloaded files and temporary files. Ryoan backs in-memory
files with a set of 4 KB blocks indexed by a two-level tree structure (similar
to a page table). Ryoan allocates the blocks of a file on-demand as the file
grows. The maximum size of an in-memory file is 1 GB. Ryoan backs in-
memory directories with a hash table, and we use reference counts to track
the lifetime of files. This virtual file system supports standard APIs, including
open, close, read, write, stat, lseek, unlink, mkdir, rmdir, and getdents.
When the module writes a preloaded file, the sandbox instance keeps the
original file blocks. When the module resets, Ryoan restores preloaded files to
their original versions and deletes temporary files.
Input/output buffers. For each unit of work, a module calls wait_for_work
(a system service implemented by Ryoan). The sandbox instance reads its en-
tire input from all input channels into memory buffers before returning to the
module. After processing the work unit, the module writes its output to a
buffer, the sandbox instance flushes the buffer to output channels on the next
wait_for_work call. Before writing out the data the sandbox instance pads
or truncates the output to a size calculated using a fixed function of input size
according to the DAG specification. The module accesses these buffers via file
descriptors using APIs implemented in the virtual file system, just like using
regular pipes or sockets.
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4.4.5 Key establishment between enclaves
Sandbox instances implement protected channels using an authenti-
cated encryption algorithm (AES-GCM [MV05]) provided by the libsodium [lib]
library. Encryption keys are agreed on at runtime using a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. SGX allows enclave code to embed the key parameters in attesta-
tions, accelerating a Diffie-Hellman key exchange between enclaves [sgx15]. On
our hardware (§5.6), SGX key exchange takes 1.78ms, while OpenSSL takes
1.90ms. Randomness is required for key exchange, and Ryoan uses the x86
instruction RDRAND to obtain it.
4.4.6 Checkpointing confined code
Ryoan uses page permission restriction and fault information to detect
module writes. Recall that SGX provides reliable memory page permissions
and information about memory faults; Ryoan does not trust the OS (§4.4.2).
The entire module is write-protected by the OS when it is confined. Ryoan
verifies that the protection was done using EACCEPT . As the module writes, the
sandbox instance catches permission faults and records the offending page’s ad-
dress before changing the permissions to allow writes and resumes the module.
However, updating the permissions in the page table requires ring-0 privilege.
The sandbox instance’s signal handler first executes outside the enclave and
makes an mprotect system call to change the page permissions, to avoid an
extra enclave exit. Once that process is complete, it enters enclave mode to
update SGX page permissions with EMODPE (and performs the bookkeeping
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mentioned above). With that done, the handler returns and normal execution
resumes.
All written pages are restored to their initial value and made unwritable
again to reset the enclave. In our prototype, before Ryoan confines an un-
trusted module for the first time, the sandbox instance creates a checkpoint by
copying the module’s complete writable memory state. This copy-on-initialize
strategy optimizes the case where sandbox instances are created once and then
used and reset for many requests. If the copy-on-initialize cost is too high,
Ryoan could incrementally create the checkpoint by doing a copy-on-write for
each request, gradually accumulating and preserving unmodified versions of
any page modified during any execution.
In our prototype, the Ryoan checkpoints when the module blocks on
wait_for_work and restores the next time the module blocks on wait_for_work.
This gives module writers clear semantics about what state will not persist
across invocations and allows the sandbox instance to purge any secrets kept
in registers.
Restoring a checkpoint does incur additional page faults, which could
be used as a channel to leak data. We find these additional faults acceptable
as even normal page accesses by the module are a channel between module and
OS that SGX does not close [XCP15]. Page faults will continue to leak infor-
mation about enclave execution until future generations of hardware enclaves
can service their page faults (§3.2.2), or SGX provides another hardware fix.
To make Ryoan execution on current SGX hardware more secure, we could
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save/restore all writable regions of the module instead of tracking individual
pages using write protection. This strategy is less efficient but does not leak
additional per-page information.
4.5 Use cases
This section explains four scenarios where Ryoan provides a previously
unattainable level of security for processing sensitive data. For all examples,
the sandbox instances could execute on the same platform or different plat-
forms, e.g., the entire computation might execute on a third-party cloud plat-
form like Google Compute Engine, or a provider’s module might execute on
its own server. Ryoan’s security guarantees apply to all scenarios.
4.5.1 Email processing
A company can use Ryoan to outsource email filtering and scanning
while keeping email text secret. We consider spam filtering and virus scanning,
using popular legacy applications — DSPAM 3.10.2 and ClamAV 0.98.7.
The computation DAG for this service contains four sandbox instances,
each confining a data processing module (see Figure 4.6). An email arrives at
the entry enclave over a secure channel, which distributes the email text and
attachments to the enclaves containing DSPAM and ClamAV, respectively.
The virus scanning and spam filtering modules forward their results to a final
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Figure 4.6: Topologies of Ryoan example applications. Nodes in the graph
are sandbox instances, though we identify them by their untrusted module.
Users establish secure channels with trusted Ryoan code for the source and
sink nodes to provide input and get output, respectively.
4.5.2 Personal health analysis
Consider a company (e.g., 23andMe) that provides customized health
reports for users based various health data. 23andMe accepts a user’s genetic
data, medical history, and physical activity log as input; extracts important
health features from these data; and predicts the likelihood of certain dis-
eases [23aa]. Since genetic and health information is extremely sensitive, users
may not feel comfortable with the company keeping their data. To encourage
the use of the service, 23andMe can deploy it with Ryoan, assuring users that
the code that processes their data cannot retain or leak their secrets.
23andMe owns its research results about the associations between dis-
eases and health features. However, it may want to use a third-party machine-
learning service in the cloud (e.g., Amazon Machine Learning [aml]) to train
its model and generate predictions. 23andMe’s trade secret is how to map
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a user’s complex, multi-modal health data onto machine learning features.
Amazon Machine Learning provides a way to train models based on unlabeled
features and software (a classifier) which queries that model. After training a
model this way, 23andMe wants to keep the input to the classifier a secret from
parties who have the means to map the inputs back to secret health data: users
of their service. Ryoan enables 23andMe to outsource machine learning tasks
to Amazon while protecting its proprietary transformation from user data to
health features.
Ryoan protects secrecy for both users and 23andMe with the DAG
shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.6. 23andMe compiles a training data set which
it transmits to Amazon to construct a model. Amazon provides the classifier
which queries that model as a Ryoan module. Users provide their genetic
information, medical history, and activity log in a request. Upon receiving a
user’s request, 23andMe’s first module constructs a boolean vector of health
features and forwards it to Amazon’s module. Amazon’s module generates
predictions based on the model and forwards the result to 23andMe’s second
enclave, which then forwards the result to the user.
The user’s label is kept throughout the entire pipeline so that all the
enclaves are confined when receiving the user’s input and cannot leak informa-
tion about the input. Further, 23andMe keeps its label with the request sent
to Amazon so that Amazon cannot leak data about 23andMe’s health features
to other parties (particularly the user) since they cannot remove 23andMe’s
label in order to release data out of Ryoan’s confinement. Amazon’s module
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passes the results of the classification to another module owned by 23andMe.
23andMe uses this module to verify that its proprietary transformations are
not in the output before removing the 23andMe label and sending the results
to the user.
Real genetic prediction models are proprietary, unknown to us, and out
of scope for this paper; our workload uses general knowledge and best prac-
tices. We train a support vector machine (SVM) and choose 20 well-studied
diseases and their top 500 correlated genes, according to a database provided
by DisGeNet [dis]. We trained the SVM models synthetic data based on that
database. Our prototype uses stochastic gradient descent as the training al-
gorithm [Bot], which allows incremental updates to existing models.
4.5.3 Image processing
Image classification as a service is an emerging area that could benefit
from Ryoan’s security guarantees (e.g., Clarifai [cla] or IBM’s Visual Recogni-
tion service [ibm]). We envision a scenario where a user wants different image
classification services based on their expertise. For example, one service might
be known for accurate identification of adult content [MP] while another might
do an excellent job of recognizing and segmenting horses. The image process-
ing DAG in Figure 4.6 shows an example where an image filtering service
outsources different subtasks to different providers and then combines them.
The user’s label is propagated to all processing enclaves, causing Ryoan to
confine their execution. Our prototype implements all of these detection tasks
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using OpenCV 3.1.0. Each detection task loads a model that is specialized in
the detection task and would represent a company’s competitive advantage.
4.5.4 Translation
A company uses Ryoan to provide a machine translation service while
keeping the uploaded text secret. Users upload text to the translation enclave
and get the translated text back. Our prototype uses Moses [mos], a statis-
tical machine translation system. We train a phrase-based French to English
model using the News Commentary data set released for the 2013 workshop
in machine translation [wmt].
4.6 Evaluation
We quantify the time and space costs of Ryoan and its components
by measuring the execution of the use cases described in the previous section
using a combination of real hardware and emulation.
We measured all benchmarks on a Dell Inspiron 7359 laptop with an
Intel Core i5-6200U 2.3 GHz processor (with Skylake microarchitecture and
SGX version 1) and 4 GB RAM. We use a laptop because it contains the first
SGX-enabled processor we could purchase; however, we validate our measure-
ments using a more recent Intel E3-1270 (see the analysis for SGX Overhead
below). We use Intel’s SGX Linux Driver [sgxb] and SDK [sgxa] to measure
SGX instructions’ costs.






































Figure 4.7: Runtimes of applications with Ryoan overheads enumerated. Each
bar represents the mean of 5 trials annotated with the 95% confidence in-
terval. Ryoan bars show percent slowdown over native. (Enc: encryp-




Email 250 emails, 30% with 103KB-12MB attachment
Health 20,000 1.4KB Boolean vectors from different users
Images 12 images, sizes 17KB-613KB
Translate 30 short paragraphs, sizes 25-300B, 4.1KB total
Table 4.2: Inputs for each Ryoan application.
we built an SGX emulator based on QEMU [qem] (full emulation mode), aug-
mented with SGX version 2 instructions. To emulate the performance of SGX
V2, we insert delays based on our measurements of current SGX hardware,
flush the TLB according to Intel’s SGX specification, and estimate overhead
for V2 instructions based on the performance of V1 instructions. We could
not use OpenSGX [JDK+16], because it lacked 64-bit signals. Our emulator
can run a complete software stack, including an SGX-aware Linux kernel.
4.6.1 Understanding workload performance
Figure 4.7 shows a breakdown of the various sources of overheads for
Ryoan. The baseline is to run applications built for a native Linux environment
and then add sandboxing, encryption, syscall marshaling, checkpoint restore,
and SGX (where SGX overheads are a mix of emulation and measurements,
see the discussion below). Table 4.2 shows the inputs for each of the work-
loads, and detailed measurements for each module in the DAG and counts of
important events (see Section 4.5 for more details about the workloads).
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Load Inited CPR Init CPU





Distribute 18.0 18.1 11.6MB 0.59 1.32
DSPAM 19.6 273.5 45.3MB 11.15 22.10
ClamAV 21.1 403.9 83.3MB 24.96 29.17




h LoadModel 19.3 19.4 28KB 0.58 12.52
Classifier 19.3 19.4 36KB 0.58 18.23
Return 18.0 18.1 16KB 0.59 6.77
Im
ag
es Distribute 18.0 18.1 632KB 0.59 0.42
Recognize 26.6 27.1 83.2MB 0.63 24.79
Combine 18.0 18.1 2.5MB 0.59 0.36
Translation 25.3 386.9 29.1MB 2.34 26.65
Table 4.3: Breakdown of memory size and compute statistics per module per
workload. Load Size: the size of the loaded module before execution, Inited
Size: module size after initialization. Init Time: module initialization time.
CPU Time: Processing time of enclave (seconds), CPR size: data copied/ze-
roed on checkpoint restore. “Images: Recognize” reports the maximum of all
four image recognition enclaves.
Inputs. We designed workload inputs to be realistic. Email bodies are from
a spam training set [spa]. Email attachments are a set of PDFs randomly
attached to 30% of emails (and that figure is from a study of corporate email
characteristics [ema]). Images are a mix of photographs, computer-generated
patterns, and logos. Gene data was synthesized based on DisGeNet [dis].
Translation text comes from the News Commentary dataset [wmt].
Confinement overhead. In Figure 4.7, the Sandbox and Sandbox+Enc
overheads are necessary for confinement, and across all workloads, encryption
does not add significant overheads. For Genes, the confinement overhead is
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Event Counts (Thousands)





Distribute 47 60 0.47
DSPAM 1,290 1,810 6.00
ClamAV 247 423 7.00




h LoadModel 82 280 56.00
Classifier 1,840 359 151.00
Return 668 162 3.00
Im
ag
es Distribute 2 2 0.04
Recognize 88 174 6.00
Combine 14 3 0.13
Translation 303 248 8
Table 4.4: Enclave exits (System Calls, Page Faults, and Interrupts) per work-
load per module. “Images: Recognize” reports the maximum of all four image
recognition enclaves.
high (100%) because it runs a very simple SVM classifier. The actual data
processing time is small, which amplifies the effect of Ryoan’s data buffering/-
padding and serves as a worst-case scenario. For Images, the workload involves
heavy computation with OpenCV, and the confinement overhead is 18%.
Checkpoint restore overhead. The CPR Size column in Table 4.3 shows
the amount of memory copied/zeroed on checkpoint restore. Figure 4.7 (the
difference between the Sandbox+Enc+Marsh and Sandbox+Enc+Marsh+CPR
columns) shows that checkpoint restore’s impact on performance is significant
(55%) for Genes because it has the lightest per-unit workload (≈1ms) and the
relative cost of page fault handling is high; in contrast, its impact on Images
is only 3%, which has the heaviest per-unit workload (≈2s).
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SGX overhead. Executing code in an SGX-protected enclave imposes sev-
eral overheads. We simulate SGX hardware overheads by using delays to model
the performance of SGX instructions, and flush the TLB on all enclave exits
(we could not directly measure execution on our hardware because it lacks
SGX version 2 features (§4.4.1)). Besides explicit EEXIT instructions, we also
model enclave exits due to events like exceptions and interrupts (Table 4.4).
We measure a hardware delay of 3.9µs for each EENTER /EEXIT pair, and
3.14µs for each ERESUME /Async-Exit pair.
We also measured SGX instruction costs on the more recent and power-
ful Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6 3.80 GHz processor. On the Xeon processor, EENTER
/EEXIT pairs cost 2.34µs, and ERESUME /Async-Exit pairs cost 1.85µs. This
processor’s clock rate is about 65% faster than the laptop, and the SGX costs
have been reduced by about that factor.
Version 2 instructions EACCEPT , EMODPE , EMODPR are simpler than
EENTER and EEXIT , so we model their cost at one-tenth of one EENTER /EEXIT
pair. Figure 4.8 explores the effect of varying this cost on the runtime of
our workloads. If the version 2 instructions turn out to be as costly as an
EENTER /EEXIT pair (3.9µs), for instance, the running times of our email,
health, images, and translation workloads increase by 25%, 14%, 7%, and 4%
respectively.
Every checkpoint-related page fault requires one EMODPE to extend
page permissions. Every page reverted after checkpoint requires one EMODPE
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Ryoan Sensitivity to SGX V2 Instruction Costs
Figure 4.8: Ryoan application workloads’ sensitivity to emulated instruction
cost. The dashed vertical line denotes the delay (0.39µs) used to compute the
Ryoan bars in Figure 4.7.
ditional synchronization (via extended behaviors of ETRACK ) when modifying
the enclave’s page state [MAA+16]. We believe the performance effect on these
workloads will be negligible, given that our applications only have one thread
per enclave. SGX execution also requires syscall marshaling to copy system
call arguments and results to and from untrusted memory, but we measure the
marshaling overhead as negligible. All results are shown in Figure 4.7.
Checkpoint restore vs. initialization. Creating an enclave and loading
a module takes less than 0.5s for all our cases. However, Table 4.3 shows
application-level initialization times are over 20 seconds for DSPAM and Cla-
mAV because they need to load and parse databases. As a result, for this



















SGX read (decryption) slowdown
Figure 4.9: Slowdown observed with respect to LLC read-misses running the
cache-miss microbenchmark inside an SGX enclave versus running the same
code without SGX.
re-initialize the modules for every work unit. Enclave construction imposes fur-
ther overheads on re-initialization. Even the creation of small enclaves (e.g.,
298KB) incur a penalty of 30 milliseconds. In comparison, Ryoan’s checkpoint-
based reset is much more efficient, and the per-unit cost is under 10ms.
4.6.2 SGX encryption overheads
Enclave memory is encrypted whenever it leaves the processor. This
invariant means additional operations are required when the processor reads
memory from RAM: encrypt on write, decrypt on read. These additional
operations add latency to last level cache (LLC) misses. Encryption related



















SGX write (encryption) slowdown
Figure 4.10: Slowdown observed with respect to LLC write-misses running the
cache-miss microbenchmark inside an SGX enclave versus running the same
code without SGX.
LLC miss microbenchmark. To measure the memory controller overheads
of SGX, we use a microbenchmark that executes a fixed number of instructions
per cache-miss (read or write). We execute the same microbenchmark as part
of a normal process and compare it to execution in an enclave protected by
SGX. The slowdown incurred by running the microbenchmark in an SGX
enclave for a varying number of retired instructions (and for read or write
LLC misses) is shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. When computation does not
access memory (and we have a large number of instructions per cache-miss),
the enclave code’s performance is very similar to unshielded execution. The
microbenchmark makes no system calls, and we eliminated page faults by
ensuring all enclave memory is touched before measurement begins. Therefore
the only enclave exits are due to interrupts, and their effect on the total time
is insignificant.
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Instructions/LLC miss Memory controller
Benchmark Module Read Miss Write Miss SGX slowdown
Email ClamAV 1,260 5,090 32.0%
Health Classifier 14,310 24,650 3.2%
Images Recognize 32,760 9,000 1.4%
Translation (one module) 12,560 34,510 3.5%
Table 4.5: Instructions per LLC miss on Ryoan benchmarks. Memory con-
troller SGX slowdown is the slowdown measured for microbenchmarks of equiv-
alent miss patterns on SGX hardware.
Write-misses are cheap because the processor does not wait for the
memory controller to encrypt data. A last-level write cache-miss every 1,000 in-
structions incurs about 1.4% execution time overhead. Read-misses can cause
significant delays, and programs with high read-miss rates will run slowly
within an enclave. A read-miss every 1,000 instructions causes a 38.1% perfor-
mance overhead, which falls to 10.1% once the read-misses happen every 4,000
instructions. The processor often needs the data from a read before it can do
any useful work and, therefore, will stall waiting for the data to be decrypted.
To understand the slowdown that would be incurred for Ryoan’s bench-
marks due to SGX encryption overheads, we measure the number of instruc-
tions retired per LLC miss, reported in Table 4.5. We focus on the enclaves
which dominate the performance of the benchmarks.
The “Memory controller SGX slowdown” column reports our projected
enclave slowdown based on the workloads LLC rate and measurements of our
LLC miss microbenchmark. Email shows the largest effect at a projected 32%
slowdown, much higher than the other benchmarks. The other applications
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execute large numbers of instructions for every last level miss, putting our
estimate of SGX encryption overheads at less than 5%.
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Chapter 5
Telekine: Secure Computing with Cloud GPUs
GPUs have become popular computational accelerators in public clouds.
Accuracy improvements enabled by GPU-accelerated computation are driving
the success of machine learning and computer vision in application domains
such as medicine [Hem17,SFB+15] transportation [NVIb], finance [GGKSC13],
insurance [NVI16], video games [SSR], and communication [NVI17a].
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) should, in principle, make the
cloud an option for users who refuse to trust the provider. Researchers have
proposed GPU-based TEEs [VVB18] and TEE extensions for GPUs [JTK+19],
though none have been built or deployed. However, as we argue below, a design
that simply composes components that run in hardware-supported CPU and
GPU TEEs will fail to provide strong security due to side channels.
GPU-accelerated applications have three main software components:
This chapter is based on a previous publication: “Telekine: Secure Computing with
Cloud GPUS”, by Tyler Hunt, Zhipeng Jia, Vance Miller, Ariel Sezekely, Yige Hu, Christo-
pher J. Rossbach, and Emmett Witchel in the proceedings of the 17th USENIX Symposium
on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), February, 2020, Santa Clara,
California, USA [HJM+20]. My contributions to this publication include designing and im-
plementing Telekine’s data-oblivious streams, and developing the arguments around GPU
trusted execution environments.
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(1) an API and a user library (e.g., CUDA [NVIa] or HIP [HIP]) that provides
high-level programming functionality and executes on a CPU; (2) CPU-side
control code at the user and the system level that manages communication
with the GPU, and (3) GPU kernels (programs) that execute on the GPU
device itself. It is the data and code that moves between the CPU and GPU
that potentially creates side channels visible to CPU-side code.
An attacker can extract meaningful information from the execution
time of code on the GPU; through control of privileged software, a cloud
provider can easily compute these execution times on the CPU by observing
communication with the GPU. For example, we demonstrate a novel attack
on image-recognition, machine-learning models that allows malicious system
software to correctly classify images from ImageNet [DDS+09] used as input to
the model. By observing only the timing of a model trained to classify images
(the image model), we build a new model (the timing model) that classifies
images based on the execution timing of layers in the image model. Even if a
security-conscious user encrypts their input images (and decrypts them on the
GPU), a system administrator can use the GPU kernels’ timing information
(measured on the CPU) from the image model to classify the input images
anyway. We train the timing model to distinguish images of two classes with
78% accuracy. For more classes, accuracy decreases but stays above random
guessing.
We propose Telekine, a system that enables the secure use of cloud


















Figure 5.1: Telekine components and their organization.
execution environment but leave the user open to side channels when commu-
nication depends on secret data. Telekine makes communication with the GPU
TEE data oblivious, completely independent of secrets in the input data. Data
obliviousness is a strong property that excludes the existence of side-channel
attacks against CPU-side code and host/device communication whose observ-
able behavior (e.g., timing, memory accesses, DMA sizes, etc.) depends on
secret input data.
Telekine has three components (shown in Figure 5.1): libTelekine that
runs on a trusted user machine (a client), GPUs physically attached to a
cloud machine (a server) that supports GPU TEEs with specific security re-
quirements (§3.3.2), and the relay which facilitates communication between
libTelekine and the GPU. Telekine uses a GPU TEE because it needs a mech-
anism to protect GPU computation from the cloud provider; a GPU TEE is
tailored to that task.
Telekine protects the application and GPU runtime by moving it from
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the cloud to the client. The advantage of this approach is that the user must
already trust their client machine; the application and user libraries are large
and complex and, therefore, prone to side-channel attacks, making them dif-
ficult to secure if they execute in the cloud. The disadvantage is that GPU
libraries assume a local GPU with a fast, high-bandwidth connection to the
CPU. Telekine decouples the user library from low-level GPU control by in-
terposing on the GPU API and efficiently forwarding API calls to the server
(a technique known as API remoting). API remoting has often been used
to virtualize GPUs [YPAR20, GMAC10, GGS+09, SCS09, VSB14, BBNLS10,
DIM+09,DPS+11,KSL+12,LNEAEG11,LC11,Bit], but to our knowledge has
never been used for security. A client using Telekine does not need to have a
GPU installed.
Telekine treats the CPU-side control code on the cloud server (“Relay”
in Figure 5.1) as completely untrusted, almost as if it were part of the network.
The client machine establishes a cryptographically secure channel directly with
the code executing on the cloud GPU. The network and the CPU-based code
on the server can delay the computation, but cannot compromise its privacy
or integrity.
Telekine secures the communication between the client machine and
the cloud GPU by transforming the user’s GPU API calls into data-oblivious
streams. Data-oblivious streams are similar to constant time defenses [ANB+18]
in that they aim to remove timing channels by ensuring that observable events
are deterministic regardless of secrets. Telekine constructs data-oblivious streams
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by reducing all API calls to a sequence of code execution (launchKernel) and
data movement (memcpy) commands. It then schedules these commands at a
fixed rate, possibly creating new commands, or splitting memcpy commands
into fixed-size pieces. Fixed-sized, fixed-rate communication is data oblivious;
it ensures that any observable patterns are independent of the input data and,
therefore, devoid of side-channel information. Fixed-rate communication is
not a novel way to eliminate side channels, but Telekine’s design shows how
to apply it efficiently to modern GPU-based computing.
Given that Telekine requires a GPU TEE, it is logical to wonder why it
does not use a CPU TEE. After all, putting the application and programming
libraries into a CPU TEE would reduce the latency and increase the band-
width for communication between libTelekine and the GPU. Unfortunately,
Intel and ARM TEEs do not prevent side channels as part of their threat
model [Joh17, PS19]. Keystone [LKC+18] and Komodo [FBHP17] intend to
address side channels for RISC-V and ARM, respectively, but work is ongoing.
Also, making existing applications data oblivious is difficult for programmers,
requires access to source code (not needed by Telekine), and often slows down
a program greatly (e.g., Opaque [ZDB+17] slows down data analytics by 1.6–
46×). Should future CPU TEEs evolve to address side channels, Telekine can
use them. Much of Telekine focuses on securing the communication between
trusted components, which can be an improved CPU TEE and a GPU TEE,
or they can be the client machine and server GPU TEE, as they are in our
prototype.
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Contributions. Telekine is the first system to offer efficient, secure execu-
tion of GPU-accelerated applications on cloud machines under a strong and re-
alistic threat model. We use Telekine to secure several GPU-accelerated appli-
cations via two frameworks: the MXNet [CLL+15] machine learning framework
and the Galois graph processing system [PP16]. On a realistic testbed, Telekine
provides strong secrecy and integrity guarantees, including side-channel protec-
tion. MXNet [CLL+15] training for three different, modern image recognition
models incurs a 10–22% performance penalty relative to a baseline with a lo-
cally attached GPU. MXNet inference for the same models over a connection
from Austin, TX to the Vultur’s Dallas, TX datacenter [Vul] incurs a penalty
of 0-8% for batch sizes of 64 images. Telekine runs graph algorithms using
Galois [PP16] on one and two GPUs with 18%–41% overhead.
This paper makes the following contributions.
 We demonstrate a CPU-side timing attack on deep neural networks that
allows a compromised OS to correctly classify images in encrypted input
(§5.3).
 We provide a design and prototype for Telekine, a system that eliminates
CPU-based side-channel attacks against a GPU TEE with a novel variant
of API remoting to execute secret-dependent code on the GPU TEE and
a trusted client (§5.4).
 We thoroughly evaluate the performance, robustness, and security of
Telekine, protecting a variety of important workloads on one and two
GPUs: machine learning and graph processing (§5.6).
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5.1 Telekine speciation of the malicious public cloud
threat model
In all current cloud GPU platforms, the cloud provider’s privileged soft-
ware, and hence administrators, can gain easy access to GPU state, creating
a significant attack surface including explicit channels such as GPU memory,
firmware, and execution context. Work in this area agrees on the vulnerability
of any program state on the GPU to privileged software [VVB18,JTK+19].
Telekine assumes a GPU TEE, with capabilities similar to current re-
search proposals like Graviton [VVB18]. The details can vary, but a GPU
TEE establishes secure memory on the GPU device and provides a protocol to
initiate a computation that can be remotely attested to start from the correct
state (code and initial data) and execute privately and without interference
from the CPU side. We provide additional detail on Telekine’s TEE require-
ments in Section 3.3.2.
GPU TEEs do not (by themselves) secure communication with the
CPU, and our attack (§5.3) shows how much information there is in the pre-
cise timing of CPU/GPU communication. Telekine protects communication
with the GPU, guaranteeing that the adversary cannot learn about input data
directly or through side channels, including timing channels.
While secure control of a GPU has been proposed [VVB18, JTK+19],
there has been little work securing side channels. These side channels undercut
the security of the TEE. In addition to the timing attack we developed (§5.3),
AES key extraction using shared GPU hardware [JFK17,JFK16,GESM17] has
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been demonstrated. And recent side-channel attacks [NNQAG18] have shown
practical methods to fingerprint websites using performance counters observed
during GPU rendering in the browser.
5.1.1 Guarantees
Telekine provides the following secrecy properties, which prevent ex-
plicit or implicit data flow from input data to an external observer.
S1 (content): Messages are encrypted to ensure an observer cannot directly
read their content.
S2 (timing): The transmit schedule for messages is fixed. Any transmission
delays are independent of input data.
S3 (size): The size of each message is fixed. Telekine pads and/or splits
messages to achieve fixed-sized messages.
Telekine also provides the following integrity properties to ensure that
any result the user receives is either a result that could have been generated
by a GPU hosted by a completely benign cloud provider, or an error.
I1 (content): The content of all communication is protected by an end-to-end
integrity check; a message authentication code (MAC) allows Telekine
to detect modifications, returning an error if any are detected.
I2 (order): Each message carries a sequence number which allows Telekine to
detect out of order messages. The sequence numbers also prevent replay
attacks.
I3 (API-preserving): Commands issued by the application should affect
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GPU state in the same way they would on a local GPU, regardless of
any transformations that Telekine applies.
GPU commands have semantics that Telekine must maintain for cor-
rectness. For example, GPU runtimes expose a stream [NVI17b] abstraction to
application code. API calls issued by the application on the same stream are
executed serially in the order they were issued. A kernel launched from a par-
ticular stream will block the completion of subsequent API calls on that stream
until that kernel terminates. Applications can have many streams which map
to different command queues exposed by hardware. API calls made on sep-
arate streams can be executed in parallel. Telekine must respect the data
dependence semantics of streams.
5.1.2 Limitations.
Physical side channels and denial of service attacks are out of scope.
In situations where an adversary monitoring physical side channels like tem-
perature [MRR+15], power [KJJ99], or acoustical emanations [CLL+17] is a
concern, Telekine would need to be augmented with other techniques to main-
tain security. In our threat model, a cloud provider wishing to deny service
can always do so, e.g., by interrupting the network or refusing to run user
processes.
Telekine provides clients a mechanism to disguise their end-to-end run-
time but does not impose policy. Applications can choose the most efficient
policy for their security needs. We believe end-to-end runtime is a poor pre-
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dictor of input data (and our experiments in Section 5.3 bear this out), further
justifying the clients setting policy.
5.2 GPU Trusted Execution Environment requirements
Telekine assumes GPU TEE support similar to Graviton [VVB18] to
prevent MMIO access to GPU status and configuration registers during se-
cure execution. Due to Telekine’s focus on side channels, it has requirements
beyond the previously proposed GPU TEEs. These requirements are more
straightforward to provide than the core TEE functionality.
Eliminate GPU side channels. Some TEE designs allow different ten-
ants/principals to execute concurrently (e.g., SGX, Keystone), sharing the
underlying hardware. Concurrent execution is attractive from a utilization
perspective, but it provides a rich side-channel attack surface that has plagued
the security of CPU TEE designs. Telekine assumes side channels from con-
current principals (e.g., memory access timing and bandwidth) do not exist
on the GPU TEE. A conservative design that prevents hardware side channels
is to disallow concurrent execution. Graviton TEEs scrub their state (e.g.,
registers, memory, caches) after resources are freed, so there is no danger of
tenants observing transient state from any previous computation.
Conceal kernel completions. GPUs signal the CPU via an interrupt when
a kernel has completed its execution. Interrupt timing leaks information about
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the kernel’s runtime. Rather than rely on interrupts, Telekine uses data-
oblivious streams (§5.4.1) that include tagged buffers that allow the GPU
to communicate computational results back to the client. The platform only
sees DMA from the GPU to untrusted CPU memory at a fixed rate.
Support no-op kernel launches. Dependences between GPU kernels often
cause the launch of one kernel to wait for another’s completion, which provides
indirect timing information. The GPU TEE must support a no-op kernel
launch command so that Telekine can generate cover traffic to ensure the
adversary sees kernel launches at a fixed rate.
Timely command consumption. The GPU TEE should consume its com-
mand queue independent of how long kernels execute on the GPU. If the GPU
waits until each kernel completes before dequeuing the next launch command,
it can fall behind the input queue fill rate, allowing the input queue to fill.
The adversary can detect this situation by observing how often the encrypted
queue content changes, creating a proxy for kernel execution time. The GPU
should consume command queue entries at a fixed rate, discard the no-ops,
and store the real commands internally until the can execute them. Telekine
can hold back real kernel launches and send no-op launches in their places to
ensure these internal GPU queues do not fill up.
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5.3 Example side-channel attack
Telekine addresses software attacks launched by an adversary resident
on a cloud host, such as those launched by a malicious system administrator
or a network-based attacker who has compromised the platform’s privileged
software. These attacks use privileged software to compromise the privacy or
integrity of user code and data. Telekine is particularly focused on protecting
against timing channels because effective, general-purpose attacks using timing
channels have recently been demonstrated at the architecture level [KGG+18,
LSG+18,VBMW+18,SLM+19], the OS level [vSGBR18,XCP15], and the GPU
programming level [JFK17,JFK16]. Modern CPU TEEs exclude side channels
from their threat model [Joh17, PS19, GESM17], leaving current hardware-
supported security primitives vulnerable to side-channel attack. Telekine of-
fers a unique and efficient security solution for cloud resident, GPU-based
computation.
We demonstrate a proof-of-concept attack on machine learning infer-
ence in which the adversary uses the execution timing of individual GPU ker-
nels to learn information about encrypted input data. Our attack allows priv-
ileged software on the cloud host to correctly classify images using only the
timing of GPU kernel execution obtained on the CPU. The attacker can train
their timing model on their own input; they do not need the victim’s training
data. The image data remains encrypted while on the CPU, and the attack
does not require any access to GPU architectural or microarchitectural state
(including GPU timers).
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Random Guess and worse
Figure 5.2: Accuracy of multiclass classification for side-channel attacks for
increasing numbers of input classes.
Attack basics. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are a popular neu-
ral network architecture for analyzing images [HZRS16,SVI+16,HLWvdM17].
Each network consists of multiple layers, including convolutions, which are
good at detecting the input image features that the remainder of the network
can use to classify the image. When CNNs are executed on a GPU, the com-
putation for each layer roughly corresponds to the execution of a single GPU
kernel. While the actual mapping between layers and kernels is often more
complex, the intuition behind our attack is that the timing of the execution of
certain CNN layers (and hence their GPU kernels) indicates the presence or
absence of certain features within the input image. This mapping makes the
per-layer execution time itself a rich feature.
Telekine defeats the attack by removing the adversary’s ability to infer
the timing of individual kernels. The adversary retains only the ability to
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measure the end-to-end runtime of the inference task. However, our data
show that end-to-end runtime provides very little predictive value, making the
attack not much more accurate than randomly guessing (Figure 5.2). Telekine
gives users the mechanism to disguise their end-to-end execution time, should
they decide to do so (§5.1.2).
Attack details. We demonstrate this attack on ResNet50 [HZRS16], a CNN
widely used for image recognition, using the timing of GPU kernel completion
events as detected by the operating system on the CPU (though we monitor
a function in the GPU’s user-level runtime for ease of implementation). We
evaluate the accuracy of our attack using 5-fold cross-validation.
We start with a pre-trained model for the standard ImageNet [DDS+09]
dataset, which contains 1,000 different image classes. Figure 5.2 shows the
accuracy of distinguishing image classes based on the timing of the pre-trained
model’s layers (Per-kernel: Trained), versus the same attack using only end-to-
end timing information (End-to-end: Trained). The accuracy of the per-kernel
classifier is startlingly good for small numbers of classes: 78% for two classes,
55% for three, and 42% for four. As the number of classes of input images
increases, the accuracy of our classification declines, but it remains much better
than random guessing, outperforming guessing by over 1.9× even among 30
input image classes.
We believe the root cause of the attack is timing dependent GPU opera-









Table 5.1: Accuracy distinguishing four classes with batches of size 32, varying
the percentage of each batch containing images from the target class.
Trained with no zero-valued weights), a randomly initialized model (Per-kernel:
Random with 0.2% zero-valued weights), and a model whose weights are all
zero (Per-kernel: Zero with 100% zero-valued weights). The zero model has
bad accuracy that is close to random guessing. A randomly initialized model
is best, followed by the pre-trained model.
We generated these results using MXNet [CLL+15] ported to HIP on
the ROCm version 1.8 stack for AMD GPUs, the version used in the prototype;
we saw similar results on the 2.9 version. Preliminary tests showed that this
specific attack is much less powerful on NVIDIA GPUs.
Batched classification. Because inference is often done in batches, we ex-
amine the accuracy of a batched attack. We construct batches by splitting each
ImageNet class into disjoint training and test sets. Images are then randomly
sampled from each of these sets to form the batches.
We present the accuracy of our attack when distinguishing four Ima-
geNet classes in batches of size 32 (Table 5.1.) Each batch consists of the
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given fraction of images from a primary-class (Purity), and randomly selected
images from the remaining three classes. Our objective is to correctly identify
the primary class.
Batches help, with the accuracy of our attack improving with larger
batch sizes. Larger batches execute more operations, effectively amplifying
the timing signal our attack relies on. Moreover, larger batches smooth out
execution timings for outlier images, which would otherwise be less recogniz-
able to our attack model. When distinguishing four classes (Table 5.1), the
batched attack is better than random guessing even when only 25% of the
input images come from the target class. The accuracy increases with higher
batch purity, outperforming single images by up to 64%.
5.4 Design
Telekine secures GPU-based computation from active attackers, includ-
ing side-channel threats. Side channels include the execution timing of individ-
ual GPU kernels and data movement to and from the GPU. Telekine achieves
its security by transforming an application’s computation so that all com-
munication—including data movement—among trusted components is data
oblivious. Telekine only trusts the client machine and the in-cloud GPU TEE.
Therefore, it must efficiently coordinate the computation between these enti-
ties, even though communication occurs over a wide area network, rather than
























Figure 5.3: Detailed Telekine overview.
Telekine consists of three components (depicted in Figure 5.1, with
detail in Figure 5.3).
 LibTelekine: a library that intercepts GPU API calls from the applica-
tion and transparently transforms them into a data-oblivious command
stream.
 Relay: an untrusted process that runs in the cloud and directs the client’s
command stream to the GPU.
 GPU: a GPU (or multiple GPUs) with TEE support that meets Telekine’s
requirements (see §3.3.2 for details).
LibTelekine is linked into the application running on the client. During its
execution, the application issues a stream of GPU commands through the
normal GPU API. Similar to normal API remoting [DPS+10, VSB14, Bit],
libTelekine redirects API calls made by the client to a server process with a
GPU runtime–the relay on the cloud machine. Telekine treats the relay almost
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as if it were part of the network, relying on it to communicate with the GPU
but protecting that communication with end-to-end techniques. The relay is
not part of Telekine’s trusted computing base.
Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM [Dwo07] in our prototype) and
sequence numbers protect all communication between libTelekine and the
GPU. This protection creates a secure channel satisfying the secrecy property
S1 (content) and the integrity properties I1 (content) and I2 (order) (described
in §5.1.1), ensuring that the GPU commands issued by libTelekine can only
be read by the GPU, and any tampering or reordering is detectable. How-
ever, by observing when messages are exchanged with the GPU (regardless of
whether they are encrypted), the adversary can get timing information about
the computation on the GPU.
Telekine’s goal is to remove all timing information from the encrypted
stream of GPU commands. It removes timing information by sending com-
mands (GPU runtime API calls like launchKernel and memcpy) at a fixed
rate, independent of input data. Fixed-rating is a simple idea, but Telekine
must overcome two major challenges to fix-rate GPU communication.
1. Different GPU command types are distinguishable because they have dif-
ferent sizes, and they result in different communication patterns with the
GPU. (e.g., launchKernel commands interact with MMIO ring buffers
and memcpy commands are handled using DMA). Telekine must ensure
that the attacker’s ability to distinguish between these commands con-
veys no information about the input data.
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2. Conventional GPU command streams (§5.1.1) exhibit a variety of data-
dependent behavior whose timing is externally visible (e.g., a kernel
launch after a data transfer will wait for the data transfer to finish).
Telekine must maintain the ordering semantics induced by such data
dependencies.
Telekine introduces a new primitive to overcome these challenges: data-
oblivious streams. Data-oblivious streams transparently replace conventional
GPU streams (and applications may have more than one), maintaining their
semantics while making their communication with the GPU data oblivious.
First, they separate commands by type and schedule each type independently.
Second, they split, pad, and batch commands of each type so that the en-
crypted payload is always the same size for messages of that type, satisfying
S3 (size). Third, they inject management commands as needed to maintain
data-dependencies across message types, satisfying I3 (API-preserving). Fi-
nally, data-oblivious streams send the transformed commands according to a
fixed schedule, satisfying S2 (timing).
The relay, privileged software on the cloud machine and the network
stack can delay commands since they are under complete control of the (pos-
sibly adversarial) cloud provider. However, they cannot delay commands in
a way that leaks input data because all observable behavior of the trusted
computing base (including its timing) is independent of input data.
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5.4.1 Data-oblivious stream construction
Constructing data-oblivious streams only requires reasoning about mem-
cpy and launchKernel commands. The TEE takes care of initialization
(§3.3.2). The only other runtime commands deal with stream synchronization,
and Telekine transforms those commands into memcpy and launchKernel com-
mands as well (discussed fully in §5.4.4). memcpy commands are visible to the
untrusted host’s privileged software because GPU drivers use DMA for efficient
data transfers. In Telekine, the data itself is protected and copied to/from a
fixed staging area in untrusted GPU memory, so the destination/source of the
memcpy does not leak information.
Conventional GPU streams can create timing channels from memcpy
and launchKernel commands because a memcpy command waits for all previ-
ous launchKernel commands on the same stream. To eliminate this channel,
Telekine uses two GPU streams to construct a single data-oblivious stream.
Telekine uses one GPU stream to launch the application’s kernels; this stream
is called the ExecStream. Telekine uses the other stream—called the XferStream—
to move data to and from the GPU. Telekine ensures that commands on the
XferStream never leak information about the kernel execution time by waiting
for commands on the ExecStream.
The ExecStream. Application kernels are all launched on the ExecStream.
LibTelekine maintains a queue of the launchKernel commands requested by
the application and releases the commands in order according to the fixed-rate
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schedule. The GPU consumes these commands independently of any ongoing
kernel execution and buffers them internally since their execution must be seri-
alized according to GPU stream semantics. Telekine honors data dependencies
between memcpy and launchKernel commands by inserting data management
kernels that block the progress of the ExecStream by spinning until the data
is in place.
The XferStream. Telekine launches data transfers requested by the ap-
plication on the XferStream. Unlike launchKernel commands, memcpy com-
mands are directional (i.e., client-to-GPU and GPU-to-client), and directions
are detectable. For example, because the adversary can observe interaction
with the network, it can differentiate between messages that came over the
network in transit to the GPU, and messages copied from the GPU to be sent
over the network. LibTelekine maintains separate queues for each direction and
schedules them independently to avoid leaking information. Data for client-to-
GPU transfers starts on the client, flows through the relay, and into untrusted
memory on the GPU. LibTelekine then enqueues a kernel, which moves the
data from the untrusted staging memory into trusted GPU memory. Simi-
larly, in the GPU-to-client direction, Telekine first enqueues a launchKernel
on the XferStream to move the data into untrusted GPU memory, then issues
a memcpy to copy it to the relay where it can be transferred over the network
back to the client.
99
Fixed-size commands. Telekine ensures that all memcpy commands are the
same size by splitting and padding the memcpy commands issued by the ap-
plication to a standard size. When there are no pending memcpy commands,
Telekine maintains the same data flow rate by scheduling dummy, standard-
sized memcpys to/from a staging buffer. Similarly, Telekine pads all launchK-
ernel commands are to the same size (320 bytes in our prototype). When no
launchKernel command is available, Telekine schedules no-op launchKernel
commands.
Schedules. Any schedule Telekine uses for GPU communication is secure so
long as it does not depend on the data being protected. Our prototype uses
simple schedules which send a fixed number of fixed-sized commands after
each fixed-time interval. For instance, Telekine might launch 16 kernels on the
ExecStream every three milliseconds, and send then receive 4MB of data every
six milliseconds on the XferStream.
Schedules can leak the category. While scheduling work at a fixed rate
is a well-known technique to avoid side-channel leakage, the exact schedule
is relevant to performance. We report our schedules in Table 5.2, and they
are the same for all tasks of a given category, e.g., training different machine
learning models with MXNet. However, they can differ across categories, e.g.,
Galois has a different ExecStream schedule from MXNet (§5.6). Under our
threat model, the adversary would be able to differentiate these workloads
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Algorithm 1 Telekine’s replacement functions for memcpy and launchKernel.
Splitting and padding steps are omitted for brevity.
1: function LaunchKernel(kern, args...)
2: Enqueue(kernelQueue, {kern, args})
3: end function
4:
5: function MemcpyH2D(src, dst)
6: buf ←ChooseTaggedBuffer()
7: LaunchKernel(copy in, buf, dst)
8: Enqueue(dataQueueH2D, {src, buf })
9: end function
10:
11: function MemcpyD2H(src, dst)
12: buf ←ChooseTaggedBuffer()
13: LaunchKernel(copy out, src, buf )
14: Enqueue(dataQueueD2H, {buf, dst})
15: end function
from their network traffic. A user can always choose a more generic, but lower
performing schedule if this is a concern.
5.4.2 Telekine operation
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 provide a high-level description of Telekine’s
data-oblivious streams. In Algorithm 1, Telekine intercepts the application’s
calls to launchKernel and memcpy and transforms them into interactions with
queues: kernelQueue, dataQueueH2D, and dataQueueD2H (splitting, padding,
and encryption steps are omitted for brevity). The Telekine threads shown in
Algorithm 2 dequeue the commands and release them to the GPU according
to the schedule. Telekine waits at lines 7, 18, and 29 for the next available time
slot, ensuring that interactions with the queues do not influence the messages’
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Algorithm 2 Periodic tasks performed by Telekine according to the schedule.
Encryption and decryption steps are omitted for brevity.
1: loop . ExecStream Thread
2: if Empty(kernelQueue) then








11: loop . XferStream Client-to-GPU (H2D) Thread
12: if Empty(DataQueueH2D) then
13: src ←dummy CPU
14: dst ←ChooseTaggedBuffer()
15: else






22: loop . XferStream GPU-to-Client (D2H) Thread
23: if Empty(DataQueueD2H ) then
24: src ←ChooseTaggedBuffer()
25: dst ←dummy CPU
26: else




31: if dst 6= dummy CPU then







Most memcpy commands have strict ordering requirements with respect
to kernels that operate on their data. The memcpy then launchKernel idiom
ensures that the launched kernel has fresh data to process. While Telekine de-
couples memcpy commands by scheduling them on their own stream for security,
it needs to preserve the original ordering semantics expected by the application.
Telekine maintains these semantics by injecting its own data management ker-
nels into the ExecStream (shown on lines 7 and 13 of Algorithm 1) to enforce
the ordering expected by the application. These data management kernels
operate on tagged buffers, which Telekine uses to synchronize data access.
Tagged buffers. Tagged buffers are pre-allocated staging buffers on the
GPU, each with an associated tag slot. Telekine assigns every memcpy opera-
tion a tagged buffer and a unique tag, represented by “ChooseTaggedBuffer” in
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Data management kernels producing data (e.g.,
copying out the result of a kernel computation) write the tag into the tag slot
of the chosen tagged buffer after the operation has completed and a memory
barrier completes. Data management kernels that consume data (e.g., some
kernels wait for data a kernel expects to use as input) wait until the tag slot
of the assigned buffer contains the expected value. They cannot be sure the
buffer data is valid until the tag value matches its expectation.
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Data management kernels. Telekine inserts its own data management
kernels into the ExecStream; these kernels either produce or consume tagged
buffers depending on the direction of the transfer. There are two kernels:
copy_in and copy_out. Both kernels take an application-defined memory lo-
cation, a tagged buffer, and a tag as arguments. For CPU-to-GPU memcpys,
libTelekine inserts a copy_in launch into the ExecStream. The copy_in will
repeatedly check the tag slot of the buffer; completing the copy to the applica-
tion’s buffer only after verifying the tag slot matches the tag it was given as an
argument. To service GPU-to-CPU memcpys, Telekine inserts a copy_out into
the ExecStream after the application kernel, which generates the data. The
copy_out writes the data to the assigned tagged buffer, followed by the tag to
signal to Telekine that the data is ready. Since libTelekine runs on the client,
it has no way of knowing when the copy out has completed until the tagged
buffer has been copied back, so it will retry the same GPU-to-CPU copy until
the tag is correct corresponding to a complete copy. This check is represented
by the PEEK operation on line 27 of Algorithm 2; libTelekine only dequeues
the operation after verifying that the copy_out kernel did its work on line 32.
GPU-to-GPU data copies. Emerging hardware supports dedicated, high-
bandwidth, cross-GPU communication links such as NVLink [Fol16]. NVLink
improves cross-GPU data copy efficiency but does not change the fundamental
communication mechanisms used in a GPU stack. Telekine currently imple-
ments GPU-to-GPU copies as two copies: one from the first GPU back to the
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client and the second from the client to the second GPU. Direct GPU-to-GPU
copies using NVLink would be far more efficient, but to be data oblivious, they
would have to occur at a fixed rate. We leave this task for future work.
Discussion. The XferStream is carefully constructed so that it never syn-
chronizes with the ExecStream. The XferStream contains DMA operations,
which the OS can detect; if application kernels on the ExecStream occupy the
GPU causing the encryption kernels on the XferStream—and transitively the
DMAs—to wait, then the platform can learn some information about kernel
execution times. There may still be leakage between the XferStream and the
ExecStream because we cannot guarantee that kernels of the former will not
interfere with the latter. However, we believe this leakage to be hard to exploit
in practice, we have not seen it in any of our benchmarks, and we expect that
future GPU features like strict priority [NVI18] or preemption [TGC+14] will
allow Telekine to seal the leak.
5.4.3 Data movement example.
Figure 5.4 how Telekine transforms application commands into equiv-
alent, data-oblivious commands on the ExecStream and XferStream. The
application issues three commands: 1 copy data to the GPU, 2 launch a
kernel to process that data, and 3 copy the results of the computation out
of the GPU back to the CPU.
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/* copy data to GPU */
memcpy(GPUbuf_0,CPUbuf_0);
/* compute result */
launchKernel(AppKern,GPUbuf_1,
GPUbuf_0);
/* copy result from GPU */
memcpy(CPUbuf_1,GPUbuf_1);
/* wait for memcpy */
launchKernel(copy_in,GPUbuf_0,
TAGbuf_0,t0);
/* do App’s work */
launchKernel(AppKern,GPUbuf_1,
GPUbuf_0);
/* notify result ready */
launchKernel(copy_out,TAGbuf_1,
GPUbuf_1,t1);
/* encrypt data */
CPU_encrypt(out_buf,CPUbuf_1,key);
/* copy encrypted data to GPU */
memcpy(STGbuf_0, out_buf);




/* encrypt on GPU */
launchKernel(encrypt,STGbuf_1,
TAGbuf_1,key);




} while (TAG(in_buf) != t1);
CPU_memcpy(CPUbuf_1,in_buf); 





Figure 5.4: API calls made by the application and their mapping to underlying
commands performed by Telekine.
1 : The application requests a memcpy from CPUbuf_0 to GPUbuf_0.
In response, Telekine chooses a tag, t0, and tagged buffer, TAGbuf_0, for this
operation. Then, it enqueues a kernel, copy_in, on the ExecStream. The
copy_in kernel will spin on the GPU, using atomic operations to check the
end of TAGbuf_0 until it sees t0. Then it copies the contents of TAGbuf_0
into GPUbuf_0. On the XferStream, Telekine encrypts the data, then copies
the encrypted data to a staging buffer in untrusted GPU memory STGbuf_0.
Finally, Telekine launches a kernel, decrypt, on the XferStream, which reads
the encrypted data out of untrusted memory and decrypts it into TAGbuf_0.
After the data is written, the tag t0 is appended after a memory barrier,
signaling to copy_in that the data is ready.
2 : The application launches its kernel, AppKern, which processes
the data in GPUbuf_0 and writes its result into GPUbuf_1. Since AppKern
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is launched on the ExecStream after copy_in, it will wait for copy_in to com-
plete, ensuring that the data will be in GPUbuf_0 before AppKern starts. The
platform cannot detect that AppKern has started.
3 : The application issues a request to copy the results of AppKern
from GPUbuf_1 to CPU_buf1. In response, Telekine again chooses a tag and
tagged buffer, t1, and TAGbuf_1, respectively, and immediately enqueues a
copy_out kernel on the ExecStream. After the application’s kernel, AppKern,
has completed, copy_out moves the result of its computation in GPUbuf_1 into
TAGbuf_1 then atomically appends t1. While waiting for copy_out to finish,
Telekine periodically encrypts TAGbuf_1 into a staging buffer in untrusted
memory, STGbuf_1 then issues a memcpy operation to copy the contents of
STGbuf_1 to a client-side buffer, in_buf. Telekine decrypts in_buf and checks
the tag. If the tag matches t1, copy_out and AppKern must have completed,
and the data can be copied into CPUbuf_1. If not, this process will be repeated
during the next scheduled GPU to client transfer.
5.4.4 Synchronizing data-oblivious streams
Applications sometimes wish to synchronize with their GPU streams
(i.e., wait for all outstanding commands to complete), or synchronize one GPU
stream with another (i.e., ensure another stream has completed some opera-
tion, n, before this stream starts operation, m). Telekine handles both of these
cases by injecting kernels that increment a counter in GPU memory between
kernels in the ExecStream.
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The increment kernel only runs after all previous kernels in the stream,
providing an accurate count of how many application kernels have executed
because of stream semantics. Telekine copies that counter back to the client
periodically and can block the application thread until all submitted work has
completed.
5.5 Implementation
The Telekine prototype is based on AMD’s ROCm 1.8 [AMD], an open-
source software stack for AMD GPUs. Telekine requires an open-source stack
because we split its functionality between user and cloud machines. NVIDIA
is generally thought to have higher hardware and software performance as well
as better third-party software support. But NVIDIA only officially supports
closed-source drivers and runtimes.
LibTelekine and the relay. All applications were ported to use HIP [HIP],
the ROCm CUDA replacement. LibTelekine marshals the arguments of HIP
API calls before sending them over a TLS protected TCP connection to the re-
lay to support initialization. The libTelekine and relay prototype are use code
generated by AvA [YPAR20]; they total 8,843 and 5,650 lines of C/C++/HIP
code, respectively (measured by cloc [clo]).
GPU TEE. GPU TEE requirements are made explicit in Section 3.3.2, and
most of those requirements are safety properties that do not impact perfor-
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ExecStream XferStream
Benchmark Quantum Size Quantum Size Bandwidth
Microbench 15ms 32kerns 30ms 1MB 533 Mb/s
MXNet 15ms 512kerns 30ms 1MB 533 Mb/s
Galois1 15ms 32kerns 30ms 1MB 533 Mb/s
Galois2 15ms 32kerns 30ms 1MB 533 Mb/s
Table 5.2: Data-oblivious schedule parameters and the network bandwidth
required. MicroBench from §5.6.1; MXNet from §5.6.2; Galois1 executes on
one GPU, Galois2 on two from §5.6.3. ExecStream sizes are the number of
kernel launches, each of which is 320 bytes. XferStream streams contribute
twice their size to bandwidth consumption because Telekine copies data in
both directions at every quantum.
mance. A notable exception is the cryptography required to secure the secrecy
and integrity of kernel launch commands. We model the timing of these fea-
tures by decrypting kernel launch commands in the relay.
5.6 Evaluation
We quantify the overheads of the security Telekine provides by com-
paring it to an insecure baseline: applications run on cloud provider machines
that offload computation to GPUs directly through the GPU runtime.
We measure Telekine across two testbeds. The first is the simulated
testbed, which simulates the wide-area network (WAN) latencies and band-
width, providing a controlled environment for measurement. The second is
the geodist testbed in which the server and client are geo-distributed and con-
nected by the Internet. Both testbeds use the same “cloud machine” (the
server), which has an Intel i9-9900K CPU with eight cores @3.60GHz, 32GB
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of RAM, and two Radeon RX VEGA 64 GPUs each with 8GB of RAM. All
machines are running Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS with Linux kernel version 4.13.0,
and AMD’s ROCm-1.8 runtime and HIP-1.5 compiler.
In the simulated testbed, the client has an Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6 pro-
cessor with four cores @3.8GHz and 32GB of RAM. Both this client and the
server have a Gtek X540 10Gb NIC, which we connect directly. We simu-
late a client-to-cloud network connection in a controlled environment using
netem [net19], which allows us to add network delays and limit bandwidth.
We always limit the bandwidth of the connection to 1Gbps, and unless oth-
erwise mentioned, we add delays in both directions so that the total round
trip time (RTT) is 10ms. These parameters are conservative for a network
connection to an edge cloud server [YHQL15,CP17].
In the geodist testbed, the client is a VM hosted by vultr [Vul] in their
Dallas, TX datacenter (the server is in Austin, TX). The VM has eight vCPUs
and 32GB of RAM. We measured the RTT between the server and this client
at 12ms, and the average bandwidth at 877Mbps.
Different applications use different schedules to get good performance,
though Table 5.2 shows strong similarity among the data-oblivious schedules
we use for evaluation.
5.6.1 Telekine performance tradeoff
Figure 5.5 shows the performance tradeoff for a microbenchmark with
16MB of input and output and a GPU kernel with a configurable running time
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ResNet InceptionV3 DenseNet
Model size 97.5 MB 90.9 MB 30.4 MB
Input size
Input image 224x224x3 299x299x3 224x224x3
Batch size 64 64 48
Data size per batch 9.2 MB 16.4 MB 6.9 MB
Single-GPU training baseline
T-put 20.27 MB/s 11.05 MB/s 13.57 MB/s
T-put (less sync) 22.69 MB/s 11.66 MB/s 17.46 MB/s
Table 5.3: Overview of machine learning training on MXNet. The input size is
given in pixel dimensions, batch size in images per GPU. T-put is throughput.
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.6 3.2 6.4 12.8 25.6
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+Encryption
API remoting
Figure 5.5: A microbenchmark that shows how Telekine overheads decrease as
the running time of the GPU computation increases.
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on the simulated testbed. The different lines show the costs of specific sources
of overhead. The“API remoting”line uses the XferStream and the ExecStream
over the network. The “+Encryption” line adds encryption to API remoting.
Finally, the “Data-oblivious scheduling” line adds the data-oblivious schedule
described in Table 5.2 to encryption. When the GPU kernel executes for only
0.14 seconds, the overhead of Telekine is nearly 8×. Once the computation
takes 4.4s, the overhead is only 22%. Telekine is a remote execution system;
it makes communication more expensive because of its oblivious scheduling
as well as network delay and limited bandwidth. It is most efficient when
computation dominates communication, which is the case for our benchmarks.
5.6.2 Machine learning algorithms
We port MXNet [CLL+15], a state-of-the-art machine learning library,
to run on the HIP runtime. Our port is based on MXNet v1.1.0 (git commit
07a83a03). We also use AMD’s MIOpen library for efficient neural network
operators. Some parts of MXNet adaptively choose from different GPU kernel
implementations by measuring execution times on the available hardware and
choosing the most performant option. To ensure the baseline and Telekine
are running the same kernels for measurement purposes, we record the kernels
chosen by the baseline and hard-code those kernel choices for all runs.
Optimizing MXNet. We applied several optimizations to MXNet, which
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Figure 5.6: Performance of machine learning training algorithms using a single
GPU with Telekine on the simulated testbed.
ResNet InceptionV3 DenseNet
1.23× 1.08× 1.20×
Table 5.4: Performance of machine learning training algorithms on Telekine,
measured on the geodist testbed.
a WAN:
 The models we evaluate represent the pixel channels of the input
bitmaps using 4-byte floating point quantities, even though they range in in-
teger values from 0 to 255. To save network bandwidth, we send bytes instead
of floats, reducing bandwidth by 4×. Bytes are changed back floats on the
GPU.
 We determined that MXNet was overly conservative in its GPU syn-
chronization strategy and were able to reduce the number of synchronizations it
performs by removing unnecessary calls to hipStreamSyncronize (“less sync”
in Table 5.3). Telekine also optimizes synchronization calls by using tagged
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buffers (§5.4.1) to coordinate data transfers.
Machine learning training. We evaluate the training performance of deep
neural networks on Telekine using three state-of-the-art convolutional neural
network architectures: ResNet [HZRS16], InceptionV3 [SVI+16], and DenseNet [HLWvdM17].
All models are trained using the ImageNet dataset (a substantial data set con-
sisting of 1.4 million training images). For ResNet, we use the 50-layer variant.
For DenseNet, we use the 121-layer variant. We evaluated all networks using
batches size of 64. Table 5.3 summarizes the input sizes that were used to
evaluate the three network architectures.
Figure 5.6 shows the performance of training three neural nets on
Telekine using the simulated testbed, normalized to the insecure baseline. The
bars break down Telekine’s overheads and match the descriptions from Sec-
tion 5.6.1. Both Telekine and the baseline use a single GPU. Table 5.4 shows
the same experiment on the geodist testbed; the results are similar to the
simulated testbed.
Machine learning inference. We evaluate neural network inference work-
loads for ResNet, InceptionV3, and DenseNet with Telekine. For inference,
latency is the priority for users, but throughput is still a priority for providers.
Batching inference can substantially improve throughput by fully utilizing
hardware capabilities and amortizing the overheads from other system com-
ponents [CWZ+17]. We evaluate the latency of inference with different batch
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Batch ResNet InceptionV3 DenseNet
size Base Telekine Base Telekine Base Telekine
Simulated testbed
1 20 273 (13.7x) 29 259 (8.93x) 26 248 (9.54x)
8 42 270 (6.43x) 65 264 (4.06x) 47 241 (5.13x)
64 233 389 (1.67x) 368 559 (1.52x) 246 405 (1.65x)
256 988 1195 (1.21x) 1520 1806 (1.19x) 946 1163 (1.23x)
Geodist testbed
1 20 200 (10.0x) 31 205 (6.61x) 26 201 (7.73x)
8 69 241 (3.49x) 111 247 (2.23x) 84 209 (2.49x)
64 462 481 (1.04x) 637 685 (1.08x) 484 483 (1.00x)
Table 5.5: Latencies (in ms) of machine learning inference workloads with the
baseline system (Base in the Table) and Telekine.
sizes, ranging from 1 to 256. Our baseline is an insecure server with one local
GPU, communicating with them over the network. Table 5.5 shows the infer-
ence latency of three neural networks with different batch sizes. The overheads
with on the simulated testbed for batches of size 256 are 21%, 19%, and 23% for
ResNet, InceptionV3, and DenseNet, respectively, which are slightly improved
compared to the overheads we report for training (§5.6.2), although the train-
ing batch size was 64. With a batch size of 64, the overheads on the simulated
testbed inflate to 67%, 52%, and 65%. When we move to the geodist testbed,
the baseline’s performance suffers more than Telekine; at batches of size 64,
the standard deviation of our measurements exceeds the differences between
the mean Telekine and baseline runs. Clipper [CWZ+17] uses an adaptive




BFS (1 GPU) 1.18x
SSSP (1 GPU) 1.21x
Pagerank (1 GPU) 1.29x
BFS (2 GPUs) 1.38x
SSSP (2 GPUs) 1.41x
Table 5.6: Performance of Galois applications with Telekine.
5.6.3 Graph algorithms
Galois is a framework designed to accelerate parallel applications with
irregular data access patterns, such as graph algorithms [PP16]. We port
Galois’s GPU computation to use the HIP runtime instead of CUDA and
evaluate it on three graph algorithms: breadth-first search (BFS), PageRank,
and single-source shortest paths (SSSP). All measurements use the USA roads
graph dataset [DIM05]. Figure 5.6 shows the performance of these applications
on Telekine with one and two GPUs. The baseline is an unmodified system
with local GPU(s). Baseline performance for single GPU applications is BFS
54.1s, SSSP 74.6s, Pagerank 60.9s; for two GPUs: BFS 36.4s, SSSP 42.8s. For
the input distributed with Galois, two GPU Pagerank slows down, so we do
not evaluate it.
Telekine imposes moderate overheads on single-GPU Galois applica-
tions, adding latency to data transfer times. Galois implements each graph
algorithm as a single GPU kernel that is iteratively called until the algorithm
reaches termination. Multi-GPU applications exchange data between GPUs
through the host after each iteration. Telekine imposes higher overheads for
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RTT (ms) ResNet InceptionV3 DenseNet
10 1.19x 1.10x 1.22x
20 1.29x 1.13x 1.37x
30 1.44x 1.16x 1.49x
40 1.53x 1.18x 1.66x
50 1.62x 1.30x 2.09x
Table 5.7: Normalized runtime of machine learning workloads with respect to
network round trip time (RTT).
multi-GPU workloads because of increased data movement over the network.
5.6.4 WAN latency sensitivity
Telekine assumes that the client communicates with the server over
a WAN. The greater distances crossed by WANs result in longer round trip
times (RTTs). The batching of commands that Telekine does for security also
makes it resilient to these increased RTTs, especially when the ratio of GPU
computation to communication is high. To demonstrate this, we increased the
RTT between our machines using netem [net19] and ran the machine learning
training benchmarks for different RTTs (Table 5.7). Overheads increase with
RTT. At 30ms, which we measured to be the RTT between the client and an




Using computational resources without trusting privileged software is
an active area of research. Here we provide a survey of related work to provide
context to work described in this dissertation. We start with a survey of
shielding systems relevant to both Telekine and Ryoan, then cover work that
is relevant to each system independently.
6.1 Shielding systems.
Shielding systems are designed to protect secret data while it is being
processed in an untrusted environment. Unlike other shielding systems, Ryoan
defends against the untrusted environment and also confines the application
so that it need not be trusted to maintain data secrecy. No shielding system
besides Telekine, to our knowledge, focusses on the communication issues that
arise when shielding GPU communication from an untrusted platform.
6.1.1 Software shielding.
Software shielding uses a hypervisor or compiler to preserve the pri-
vacy and integrity of applications executing on an untrusted platform. Over-
shadow [CGL+08], InkTag [HKD+13], and Sego [KDL+16] use a trusted hy-
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pervisor to protect trusted applications from an untrusted operating system.
InkTag and Sego allow a trusted application to verify untrusted operating
system services (e.g., a file system) with help from the hypervisor. Virtual
Ghost [CDA14] uses a trusted compiler rather than a hypervisor for protec-
tion.
6.1.2 Hardware shielding.
Hardware shielding uses hardware primitives (such as SGX) to protect
applications from platform software. Haven [BPH15], Scone [ATG+16], and
Graphene-SGX [TPV17] allow a trusted program and its library operating
system to execute in an SGX enclave that protects them from attack by host
software. VC3 [SCF+15] secures trusted MapReduce using SGX.
Opaque [ZDB+17] uses carefully designed TEE code inside SGX en-
claves to prevent leakage through known SGX side channels (e.g., memory ac-
cess patterns). These techniques cannot be applied to code that is untrusted
since the secret data owner would have to verify that they are in use. Opaque
also deals with communication leakage but does not consider communication
with GPUs.
ARM TrustZone [Lim] is another commercially available hardware prim-
itive that protects computations from platform software. TrustZone provides a
single “secure world,” which allows code to execute in multiple privilege levels;
in contrast, SGX provides an unlimited number of enclaves, all of which exe-
cute at user-level. TrustZone does not currently encrypt memory, so it is less
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resistant to physical attacks, but TrustZone can deliver page faults to privi-
leged code in the secure world, eliminating controlled channel attacks [XCP15].
Komodo [FBHP17] uses formally verified software to provide an enclave ab-
straction on top of TrustZone. In order to replace SGX with TrustZone, Ryoan
would require a management layer like Komodo.
Trusted Platform Modules Attempts to use late launch and Trusted Plat-
form Modules (TPMs) for user assurance (e.g., Flicker [MPP+08]) suffer from
poor usability due to the restricted execution environment required by the
TPM. Late-launched code has no access to the operating system and must
manage the bare machine. Code executing in an enclave can be more complex
than what is practical to execute in late launch.
Ironclad [HHL+14] addresses the limitations of the late launch environ-
ment with a (small) verified system stack that must be included with each
trusted binary. Ironclad is not backward compatible and requires users to
write verified code, placing a burden on the programmer.
MiniBox [LMN+14] uses a TPM and Native Client to protect an appli-
cation and the OS from each other. Unlike Ryoan, MiniBox uses Native Client
strictly to protect the OS and its secure hypervisor, not to prevent applications
from leaking sensitive data.
For all TPM-based systems, a computation’s data is visible on the
memory bus, where an unscrupulous administrator of the host platform can
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steal it. SGX enclave data is encrypted before it travels across the memory
bus, preserving an enclave’s secrecy.
6.1.3 Cryptographic shielding.
Homomorphic encryption [Gen09,BV11] allows untrusted code to com-
pute directly on encrypted data with strong security guarantees. Unfortu-
nately, practical implementations of general-purpose homomorphic encryption
are not available, and current overheads are prohibitive.
Property-preserving encryption (for instance, order-preserving encryp-
tion [BCLO09]) can protect the secrecy of some computations [NKW15], and
some systems use these primitives [PRZB11, BPTG15, SLPR15]. However,
these systems have weaker security guarantees [GRS17], apply to limited sce-
narios, or have a significant performance overhead. In comparison, Ryoan’s
confinement does not require domain-specific knowledge about the applica-
tions. However, Ryoan does require stronger assumptions, i.e., that hardware
and the Ryoan runtime are correct.
6.2 Timing and termination channels
Both Ryoan and Telekine are concerned with limiting information leak-
age through timing and termination channels. Timing and termination chan-
nels are studied in previous work [KWH11,For10] in the context of information
flow control. In Ryoan, a module has to terminate for each unit of work, and
the processing-time channel can only be used once per unit; different units will
121
not interfere due to module reset. In Telekine the end-to-end execution time
of the application is leaked, but it is only leaked once and we found the end-
to-end time to be a much weaker signal than the execution time of individual
GPU kernels.
OS-level time protection. Recent extensions to seL4 [GYCH19] suggest
general OS-level techniques that prevent timing-based covert channels by elim-
inating the sharing of hardware resources that can form the basis of covert
channels. These techniques are not adequate to prevent malicious code from
modulating its behavior time purposefully leak secrets, although they do lower
their bandwidth. The techniques do not yet generalize to I/O-attached accel-
erators.
6.3 Work related to Ryoan: decentralized information
flow control
Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) allows untrusted appli-
cations to access secret data but prevents them from leaking data to unau-
thorized parties. However, most DIFC systems require that all trusted code
is deployed in a centralized platform or administrative domain under a trusted,
privileged reference monitor [KYB+07,VEK+07,PBR+14,ZBwKM06,LGV+09,
AGL+12]; similar enforcements have also been realized in a browser (COWL
[SYM+14]) and a mobile device (Maxoid [XW15]). Two exceptions are DStar
[ZBWM08] and Fabric [LGV+09], which do not have a centralized reference
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monitor. However, although a DStar or Fabric user does not need to trust
all machines involved in the system, they must trust the machine on which
they process their data, which means a correct reference monitor (the OS or
runtime that supports DIFC) must be properly installed on the machine, and
that the machine’s administrator does not use root privilege to steal secret
data. Such trust is not required in Ryoan.
Systems that track information flow down to the hardware-gate level
[TOL+11, TLW+09, LKO+14, ZWSM15] form a basis for strong information
flow guarantees, and close timing and cache channels ignored by Ryoan. How-
ever, such hardware is not available and, as designed, does not include the
privacy and integrity guarantees provided by SGX.
6.4 Work related to Telekine: secure computation on
GPUs
Trusted Execution Environments on GPUs. HIX [JTK+19] extends
an SGX-like design with duplicate versions of the enclave memory protection
hardware to enable MMIO access from code running in an SGX enclave. This
enables HIX to guarantee that a single enclave has exclusive access to the
MMIO regions exported by a GPU, in principle, defeating a malicious OS that
wants to interpose or create its own mappings to them. While this design
provides stronger GPU isolation than current enclaves, it remains vulnerable
to side-channel attacks because communication is not data oblivious.
Graviton [VVB18] supports GPU TEEs based on secure contexts that
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use the GPU command processor to protect memory from other concurrently
executing contexts. Similar to Telekine, Graviton secures communication us-
ing cryptographic techniques. Telekine can adopt many of Graviton’s clever
mechanisms for its TEE functionality (§3.3.2), such as restricting access to
GPU page tables without trusting the kernel driver. But Graviton does not
protect against side channels, which is Telekine’s primary mission.
The opportunity to provide stronger security for GPU-accelerated ap-
plications using TEEs and oblivious communication has been observed by oth-
ers [HJM+19].
Securing accelerators. SUD emulates a kernel environment in user space
to isolate malicious device drivers [BWZ10]. Previous work has explored tech-
niques to support trusted I/O paths, leveraging hypervisor support [WW17,
ZGNM12] or system management mode [KKJ+16]. Our work focuses on the
secure use of GPUs with untrusted system software and does not rely on sup-
port from the software at lower privilege layers. Border Control [OPHW15]
addresses security challenges for accelerator-based systems but focuses on pro-
tecting the system from a malicious accelerator rather than Telekine, which
protects CPU and GPU code from an untrusted platform.
GPU security and protection. Studies have analyzed GPU security prop-
erties and vulnerabilities [ZKR+17]. Frigo et al. [FGBR18] demonstrate tech-
niques that leverage integrated GPUs to accelerate side-channel attacks from
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browser codes using JavaScript and WebGL. PixelVault [VAPI14] exploits
physical isolation between CPUs and GPUs to implement secure storage for
keys, though it was shown to be insecure [ZKR+17]. CUDA Leaks [PLV16]
shows techniques to exfiltrate data from the GPU to a malicious user. At-
tacks that take advantage of GPU memory reuse without re-initialization are
a common theme [LKKK14,ZDL+17,HLH+17]. Several systems have proposed
mechanisms that bring the GPU under tighter control of system software, ex-
ploring OS support [RCS+11,KLRI11,GST+11,MSS14], access to OS-managed
resources [SFKW13,SFKW14,KHH+14], hypervisor support [TDC14,SKYK14,
DS09, GGS+09, SCS09, GMAC10, VSB14] and GPU architectural support for
cross-domain protection [ALM+17,CFHR17,PHW14,PHB14,VBO+16].
Secure machine learning. Ohrimenko et al. describe an SGX-based sys-
tem for multi-party machine learning on an untrusted platform [OSF+16].
Their data-oblivious algorithm for convolutional neural networks explicitly
does not support state-of-the-art operations that are data-dependent (e.g.,
max pooling). Telekine can support any data-dependent operations but re-
quires a GPU TEE. Chiron [HSS+18] provides a framework for untrusted code
to design and train machine learning models in SGX. Telekine does not sup-
port untrusted code but does allow the use of GPUs, which Chiron excludes.
CQSTR [ZYC+16] lets a trusted platform operator confine untrusted machine
learning code so that it can be securely applied to user data. By contrast,
Telekine protects user data from an untrusted platform operator. MLcap-
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sule [HZG+18] protects service provider secrets (machine learning model) and
client data by running machine learning algorithms in an SGX enclave but
does not suggest extensions to allow secure GPU acceleration.
Slalom [TB19] secures training of DNNs using a combination of TEEs
and local GPUs. Slalom’s guarantees are achieved by partitioning DNN train-
ing into linear layers using matrix multiplication, which is offloaded to a GPU,
the remaining operators, which execute on the CPU in a TEE such as SGX.
Matrix multiplication is verified and turned private using algorithmic tech-
niques [Fre77], enabling secure GPU offload without requiring GPU TEE sup-
port.
Recent work [DGBL+16,LJLA17] demonstrates how to efficiently apply
neural networks to encrypted data. As far as we know, today, there are no
practical techniques for training deep neural networks on encrypted data.
API remoting. API remoting [DPS+11,RPS+12,LC11,KSL+12,BBNLS10,
DIM+09, LNEAEG11, XBD+12] is an I/O virtualization technique that in-
terposes a high-level user-mode API. API calls are forwarded to a user-level
computing framework [SCS09] on a dedicated appliance VM [VSB14], or on
a remote server [DPS+11, KSL+12]. To our knowledge, Telekine is the first




Hardware-protected TEEs, augmented with proper techniques from
system software, are a promising step towards secure computation on un-
trusted public clouds. While the techniques described here and TEEs them-
selves certainly have their limitations, their combination represents a point in
the space that achieves meaningful security at a reasonable cost. Both Ryoan
and Telekine achieve their security goals with reasonable overheads: gener-
ally under 50% for the workloads that we measured, but of course, the actual
overheads depend very much on the application and the data being processed.
Ryoan allows users to process data with software they do not trust, ex-
ecuting on a platform they do not control safely, thereby benefiting users, data
processing services, and computational platforms. Ryoan does this by confin-
ing untrusted application code via a trusted sandbox (provided by Google’s
NaCl) that is itself made tamperproof via hardware enclave-protected execu-
tion (provided by Intel’s SGX). Ryoan also defines and enforces an execution
model that allows mutually distrustful software nodes to exchange data with-
out disclosing secrets to each other or the platform provider. We implement
and evaluate a Ryoan prototype over various case studies of real-world appli-
cations. Our evaluation, based on real SGX hardware and simulation, shows
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that Ryoan overhead is workload-dependent, 27% in the best case, and up to
419% in the worst case.
Telekine enables secure GPU acceleration in the cloud. Telekine pro-
tects in-cloud computation with a GPU TEE and application/library compu-
tation by placing it on a client machine. It secures their communication with
a novel GPU stream abstraction that ensures the execution is independent of
input data. Telekine allows GPU-accelerated workloads such as training ma-
chine learning models to leverage cloud GPUs while providing strong secrecy
and integrity guarantees that protect the user from the platform’s privileged
software and its administrators.
It is true that absolute performance is and will continue to be the most
important factor for the majority of public cloud users. Viewed through that
lens, any system with impacts performance in any amount is a non-starter.
But the work presented here achieves security that was only possible previously
with orders of magnitude of overhead (if you agree that our trust hardware is
valid). We hope that this massive reduction in overhead will open up public
clouds to more security-conscious users as they weigh public cloud deployments
against investing in their own hardware.
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